3.1 U.S. SENATORS/REPRESENTATIVES

3.1.1 California

3.1.1 (4425) Lewis, Representative Jerry and Feinstein, Senator Dianne

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. House of Representatives—California	SR330032
Lewis, Representative Jerry
U.S. Senate—California	SR330032
Feinstein, Senator Dianne

Comment

As you may know, the Inyo County Board of Supervisors in California was notified on August 21, 2001 of the DOE's decision to limit public hearings on the Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation (PSSE) to three locations in Nevada and to establish a September 20, 2001 deadline for public comment on the PSSE. Such short notice, as well as the decision to limit hearings to Nevada is, in our view, unacceptable. We are writing to request a 60-day extension of the comment period for the recently released "Yucca Mountain Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation." Further, we are asking that the Department of Energy specifically conduct a PSSE hearing in California.

Response

The DOE extended the public comment period until October 19, 2001, and held hearings in Inyo County, California. The DOE complied with the requirement for public hearings specified in Section 114(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) by holding numerous public hearings in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. On May 7, 2001, DOE issued a Federal Register notice announcing the initiation of a public comment period on a possible Secretarial recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site as a geologic repository. This notice specifically requested that the public submit comments on a potential action by the Secretary and established a mail address, electronic mail site, and telephone number for the submission of comments by electronic facsimile. On that same day, DOE released the S&ER to facilitate public comment and review.

The Federal Register and media announcements providing information on the hearings requested participation by all those choosing to attend. Once present, all those wishing an opportunity to speak were afforded such an opportunity.

On August 21, 2001, the DOE issued a Federal Register notice that announced the release of the PSSE for public review and established the closure of the site recommendation comment period as September 20, 2001. Included in that notice was the announcement of public hearings to be held in Las Vegas, Amargosa Valley, and Pahrump, Nevada on September 5, September 12, and September 13, 2001, respectively. In an August 30, 2001, Federal Register notice (66 FR 45845), DOE announced that "[I]n order to encourage and facilitate public participation in the [comment] process," it had forwarded a letter requesting comments on the overall site recommendation process and a possible decision to "a list of governmental officials and members of the public whose interest in commenting [on such matters] the Department has anticipated."

The Las Vegas hearing was held as scheduled and included teleconferencing connections to three other cities within the state of Nevada: Carson City, Elko, and Reno, and connections to the Congressional studio for comments from the Nevada delegation. However, the events of September 11, 2001, warranted the postponement of the Amargosa Valley and Pahrump hearings. These hearings were rescheduled to and held on October 10 and October 12, 2001, respectively. In response to requests from the Nevada Congressional delegation and others, the DOE extended the comment period by 15 days to October 5, 2001, in a Federal Register notice (66 FR 47644) dated September 13, 2001. Subsequently, the period was extended further to October 19, 2001. On October 2, 2001, the DOE announced in the Federal Register (66 FR 50176) that the DOE's Yucca Mountain Science Centers in Las Vegas, Pahrump, and Beatty, Nevada would be staffed with DOE representatives and public stenographers to receive comments through the end of the established comment period. On October 3, 2001, the DOE announced "...additional opportunities, in various localities in Nevada and California, for the public to provide comments on the possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for development...." These opportunities consisted of 29 hearing sessions that were held in each of Nevada's counties and California's Inyo County during the period extending from October 3 through October 12, 2001. Subsequently, a Federal Register notice (66 FR 51027) dated October 5, 2001, extended the comment period through midnight Friday, October 19, 2001. By the conclusion of the initial comment period, the DOE had held 57 public hearings on the consideration of Yucca Mountain across Nevada's 17 counties, and in Inyo County, California, providing 165 days of public comment and 345 hours of public hearing time.

In addition, on November 14, 2001, after the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) finalized 10 CFR Part 63 for licensing and the DOE finalized 10 CFR Part 963, the Secretary announced a supplemental 30 day comment period, including nine supplemental hearings in Nevada to provide citizens an opportunity to comment on information that was not available at the conclusion of the initial comment period.

3.1.2 Nevada

3.1.2 (3966) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. House of Representatives—Nevada	SR330008
Berkley, Representative Shelley

Representative Berkley also co-signed two comment letters that were submitted by Senator Reid, Senator Ensign, and Representative Gibbons. Responses to the comments contained in those letters can be found at Senator Reid's comments (3.1.2 (18855) and 3.1.2 (4537)).

Comment

As a country, we must stop trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Instead of trying to change the rules and dance around the law, we should immediately begin the decommissioning of the Yucca Mountain Project.

Response

The DOE did not amend Part 960 and adopt Part 963 to "change the rules" and "dance around the law." Rather, the purpose of the Yucca Mountain-specific guidelines in 10 CFR Part 963 (66 FR 57298) is to implement the NWPA, as amended, given the Yucca Mountain-specific licensing-related standards of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) and the NRC regulations for licensing at 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732), and to provide a technical basis to assess the suitability of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain.

Since 10 CFR Part 963 is consistent with the site-specific NRC licensing regulations and EPA standards at 10 CFR Part 63 and 40 CFR Part 197, respectively, evaluation against 10 CFR Part 960 would no longer be consistent with, and in some cases, may even conflict with, the regulatory framework that would be used to consider any license application for a Yucca Mountain Repository.

3.1.2 (3971) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Comment

I think this hearing represents yet another disingenuous action by the Department of Energy. If the DOE was serious in its desire to include the people of Nevada in the decision-making process, then they would hold these hearings at a later, more appropriate time, perhaps following the release of the final environmental impact statement. The Yucca Mountain Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation represents the most incredibly optimistic evaluation of the Yucca Mountain Project. In fact, this document, not required by law, is being published by the DOE to try to drum up support for a failing project that has run into problem after problem.

Response

The DOE acknowledges your concern that Nevadans have adequate information upon which to formulate their comments on the Secretary's consideration of the Yucca Mountain site for recommendation to the President. To facilitate public review and comment on the large amount of information the DOE has compiled over the years regarding the Yucca Mountain site, in May 2001 the DOE issued the S&ER. The information and data compiled in this report addresses the subjects described in Section 114(a)(1)(A)-(C) of the NWPA, as amended. In addition, on August 21, 2001, the DOE issued a Federal Register notice that announced the release of the PSSE for public review and comment. The DEIS and the SDEIS had also been previously made available to the public. By providing this information to the public in advance of public hearings, the DOE sought to enhance the ability of the public to review and comment on the data the DOE has compiled to date.

Subsequent to the release of these documents, the DOE complied with the requirement for public hearings specified in Section 114(a) of the NWPA by holding numerous public hearings in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. By the end of the site recommendation comment period, October 19, 2001, the DOE had held 57 public hearings on the consideration of Yucca Mountain across Nevada's 17 counties, and in Inyo County, California, providing 165 days of public comment and 345 hours of public hearing time. In addition, on November 14, 2001, after the NRC finalized 10 CFR Part 63 and the DOE finalized 10 CFR Part 963, the Secretary announced a supplemental 30 day comment period, including nine supplemental hearings in Nevada to provide citizens an opportunity to comment on supplemental information regarding the site recommendation consideration process.

The DOE believes that the documents and information provided to the public and the time allotted for their review were sufficient to enable the public to formulate their comments regarding a possible site recommendation by the Secretary.

3.1.2 (3975) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Comment

This evaluation is implausibly optimistic and sanguine in its treatment of key scientific issues relating to the site. The level of uncertainty that the DOE claims in its model is extremely small, while any serious scientific analysis would require a much larger range of uncertainty. For example, the DOE claims the range of annual radiation dosage for the individual protection standard is .08 to 0.1 millirem, a range of less than one order of magnitude. A more honest scientific evaluation would require a range of plus or minus five to six orders of magnitude. In this case, the range of dosage would exceed the EPA standard. The level of uncertainty that the DOE claims is so ridiculously narrow that even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission known for their pro-Yucca leanings refuses to grant the DOE a letter of sufficiency until the problem is rectified, further complicating the analysis of the project.

Response

Uncertainty bounds are not assumed in the scientific process, they are determined through a combination of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. The approach to evaluation of uncertainty has developed over more than a decade based on the National Academy of Sciences recommendations and the development of the EPA standards and NRC regulations for licensing. The NRC agrees with the approach to assessment of performance and has incorporated it into the NRC licensing regulations (66 FR 55732). The NRC, in a letter dated November 13, 2001, from Mr. Richard Meserve, Chairman, to Robert G. Card, Under Secretary, Energy, Science, and Environment, DOE, stated their position that based on existing knowledge and agreements between the DOE and NRC, sufficient information either is available or will be available to the DOE to support an acceptable license application if a decision is made to proceed with the Yucca Mountain Project.

The DOE has shown that the potential dose results from a repository at Yucca Mountain are well within the EPA standards and NRC licensing regulations for the nominal case, as well as the disruptive case of repository performance (SSE, Section 4.2). The DOE has evaluated the uncertainty of these analyses in the S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.4.1.2, the SSPA (SSPA Vol. 1, Section 2.1; SSPA Vol. 2, Section 2.2), the "Total System Performance Assessment—Analyses for Disposal of Commercial and DOE Waste Inventories at Yucca Mountain—Input to Final Environmental Impact Statement and Site Suitability Evaluation" [Williams, N.H. 2001. "Contract No. DE-AC08-012RW12101—Total System Performance Assessment—Analyses for Disposal of Commercial and DOE Waste Inventories at Yucca Mountain—Input to Final Environmental Impact Statement and Site Suitability Evaluation REV 00 ICN 02." Letter from N.H. Williams (BSC) to J.R. Summerson (DOE/YMSCO), December 11, 2001, RWA:cs-1204010670, with enclosure. ACC: MOL.20011213.0056.], and the "Total System Performance Assessment—Sensitivity Analyses for Final Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations" [Williams, N.H. 2001. "Contract No. DE-AC08-012RW12101—Total System Performance Assessment—Sensitivity Analyses for Final Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Rev 00 ICN 01." Letter from N.H. Williams (BSC) to S.J. Brocoum (DOE/YMSCO), December 11, 2001, RWA:cs-1204010669, with enclosure. ACC: MOL.20011213.0057]. The extensive set of analyses contained in these documents give the DOE confidence that the dose from a repository at Yucca Mountain would be below the NRC requirements for licensing. The DOE has evaluated the 95th percentile total system performance assessment (TSPA) results that are considered to be the worst case. In accordance with NRC regulations for licensing, the mean of the distribution is used for comparison.

The comment appears to be directed at the range of variation among different mean value analyses reported in the PSSE, Section 4.2, which is not a measure of uncertainty. The range of uncertainty depicted between the 5th and the 95th percentile results of the probabilistic results is shown to be about two orders of magnitude (SSPA Vol. 2, Section 4.1).

The DOE acknowledges that it is not possible to forecast with certainty what would occur hundreds or thousands of years into the future. The National Academy of Sciences, the EPA, and the NRC also recognize the difficulty of understanding the behavior of complex systems over long time periods. In 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732), the NRC acknowledges that "[P]roof that the geologic repository will conform with the objectives for postclosure performance is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word because of the uncertainties inherent in the understanding of the evolution of the geologic setting, biosphere, and engineered barrier system." What is required for licensing is reasonable expectation for such long-term performance (consistent with 40 CFR Part 197). In Subpart B, 40 CFR 197.30, the EPA establishes "reasonable expectation" as a test of compliance, with diminished "weight of evidence" with time. The EPA also recognizes the potential need for expert judgment in assigning scenario probabilities, selecting simulation models, and assigning parameter distributions. Consistent with National Academy of Sciences observations, the DOE has conducted performance assessments based on a combination of mathematical modeling, site data and information, laboratory and literature data, and natural analogues (SSPA Vol. 1, Sections 1 and 2).

The DOE's confidence in the waste disposal system is based on defense-in-depth that relies upon both natural and engineered barriers. The DOE has adopted an assessment approach that explicitly considers the spatial and temporal variability and inherent uncertainties in natural and engineered components. Confidence in the outcome of performance assessment modeling is provided for through reliance upon multiple barriers that ensure overall performance, despite the failure of one or more components to perform as expected. For example, the potential of the physical properties of the geologic medium to provide natural barriers that retard radionuclide transport is included in the assessment of overall performance. The DOE believes this process results in a reasonable estimation of dose and is sufficient for comparing the relative merits of the various repository scenarios (SSPA Vol. 1, Section 2).

3.1.2 (3977) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Comment

The projections made by the DOE are based on Environmental Protection Agency guidelines that are currently being litigated in the courts. At issue is the bewildering short compliance period of 10,000 years, and a weak millirem standards at extended distances.

Response

The DOE does not believe it is either legally required or appropriate to hold consideration of a possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site in abeyance until litigation concerning 40 CFR Part 197 is completed. Those regulations would require regulatory compliance over a 10,000-year period. Consistent with the EPA standards, DOE has computed peak dose beyond 10,000 years and included those results in the FEIS; DOE has also computed the dose out to 1 million years. The DOE believes that sufficient information and data have been developed to support a determination whether to recommend that the President approve the site for the development of a repository.

The EPA standard for the reasonably maximally exposed individual (RMEI) is 15 millirem per year over 10,000 years. For perspective, the average annual background dose in the United States is 360 millirem.

3.1.2 (3982) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Comment

This document once again demonstrates how far we've come from the original idea of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The original act was supposed to find a geological area with natural barriers that could contain the waste. This evaluation shows that the DOE is concentrating on just the opposite, on man-made structures that may or may not contain the waste. In fact, the majority of scientific uncertainty in this document centers on the potential failure of the man-made waste packages and containment structures. As a result, the DOE will end up spending, or will have to spend an astronomical amount of taxpayers' funds to build an unsafe nuclear waste dump, clouded by uncertainty and held to the lowest possible standards.

Response

The use of engineered barriers does not conflict with the NWPA and is consistent with both EPA standards and NRC licensing regulations. Section 121(b)(1)(B) of the NWPA encourages the use of multiple barriers and directs the NRC to develop criteria that would provide for the use of multiple barriers in the design of the repository. The NRC has incorporated the multiple barrier concept at 10 CFR 63.102(h) and 10 CFR 63.113 (66 FR 55805 and 55807) to enhance the resiliency of the repository and increase confidence that performance objectives will be met. Thus, the use of complementary natural and engineered barriers in the assessment of disposal system performance does not contravene the intent of the NWPA, and is consistent with Yucca Mountain-specific radiation protection regulations for licensing.

Both the natural barriers and engineered barriers would work together to contribute to the overall performance of a repository. Natural barriers limit the amount of water that could contact the waste and provide a geochemical environment that prevents mobilization and transport of most species of radionuclides. Equally important, there would be little percolation of water down through the rock layers to the repository block even during cooler, wetter periods. Engineered barriers would also limit the amount of water that could contact the waste; moreover, the waste package would contain many species of radionuclides until they decay away. For example, strontium-90 and cesium-137 would have decayed away after the first 1,000 years. Far in the future, should the waste package breach and water dissolve the cladding and waste form, the movement of the long-lived radionuclides would be retarded by the physical and chemical properties of the geologic setting. Additionally, of those few species that are mobile, natural conditions of the unsaturated rock, as well as zeolites in the rock layers underlying the repository, would retard the migration of many species of radionuclides. Many species would sorb onto the zeolites and thus provide additional delay to allow additional time for these species of radionuclides to decay away. Thus, the natural and engineered barriers working together would prevent the vast majority of radionuclide species from ever reaching the accessible environment.

3.1.2 (3983) Berkley, Representative Shelley

Comment

Scientific evidence against the proposed Yucca site is plentiful, but each time legitimate arguments are raised, standards for Yucca Mountain are changed. In fact, on three separate occasions, the State of Nevada has demonstrated, using DOE's own data, that the site should be disqualified under both the EPA standards and DOE's own internal site screening regulations, and each time the DOE or Congress has changed regulations to ensure that Yucca Mountain is not disqualified, regardless of the health and safety consequences to Nevadans.

Response

The DOE did not amend Part 960 and adopt Part 963 to avoid disqualification of the Yucca Mountain site. Rather, the purpose of the Yucca Mountain-specific guidelines in 10 CFR Part 963 (66 FR 57298) is to implement the NWPA, as amended, given the Yucca Mountain-specific licensing-related standards of the EPA at 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) and the licensing regulations of the NRC at 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732), and to provide a technical basis to assess the suitability of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain.

Since 10 CFR Part 963 is consistent with the site-specific NRC licensing regulations and EPA standards at 10 CFR Part 63 and 40 CFR Part 197, respectively, evaluation against 10 CFR Part 960 would no longer be consistent with, and in some cases, may even conflict with, the regulatory framework that would be used to consider any license application for a Yucca Mountain Repository.

3.1.2 (14401) Ensign, Senator John

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. Senate—Nevada	SR330125
Ensign, Senator John

Senator Ensign also co-signed two comment letters that were submitted by Senator Reid, Representative Berkley, and Representative Gibbons. Responses to the comments contained in those letters can be found at Senator Reid's comments (3.1.2 (18855) and 3.1.2 (4537)).

Comment

Final characterization in these public hearings are being held before we have a final environmental impact statement. That was one of the documents Governor Guinn was referring to earlier and why we as a delegation are outraged by this. We think it's a wrong process, and we feel that it may be technically legal, it is certainly not a morally right way to handle these hearings.

We have this substance that, as Senator Reid was talking about, scientists have agreed that is absolutely safe to leave on site in their dry cask storage units, take them out of the cooling pools they're in now, put them in dry cask storage, which several sites around the country are currently doing. It's the cheapest thing to do, and that storage is good for 100 years. During that period of time, we ought to take some of the money, instead of building Yucca Mountain, and invest it in what's called recycling technology. There's -- you can call it pyroprocessing, you can call it accelerator transmutation. There's lots of different terms and different processes that are being looked at, but the bottom line is we have time to look at new technology for recycling this waste.

Yucca Mountain, which was originally supposed to cost a lot less than what the current estimates are going to cost, the costs have sky rocketed. People are talking now somewhere close to $60 billion, which is the most expensive construction project in the history of the world. This is wasted money, and it is money that, frankly, we're going to bury a very valuable resource. These nuclear fuel rods, which contain radioactive elements that will last 200,000 years, instead of trying to bury these things some place, which we don't have the technology as human beings, to do that, instead of doing that, we can convert it, via these new processes, that will produce huge amounts of clean energy.

Response

The DOE acknowledges your concern that Nevadans have adequate information upon which to formulate their comments on the Secretary's consideration of the Yucca Mountain site for recommendation to the President. To facilitate public review and comment on the large amount of information, the DOE has compiled over the years regarding the Yucca Mountain site, in May 2001 the DOE issued the S&ER. The information and data compiled in this report addresses the subjects described in Section 114(a)(1)(A)-(C) of the NWPA, as amended. In addition, on August 21, 2001, the DOE issued a Federal Register notice that announced the release of the PSSE for public review and comment. The DEIS and the SDEIS had also been previously made available to the public. By providing this information to the public in advance of public hearings, the DOE sought to enhance the ability of the public to review and comment on the data the DOE has compiled to date. The FEIS, which addresses the comments received on the DEIS and the SDEIS, would accompany any site recommendation to the President.

The DOE recognizes that knowledge about other technologies for the management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste has advanced during the past 20 years (e.g., see the discussion on transmutation in Section 9.1.3 of the FEIS). Congress has directed the DOE to study accelerator transmutation of radioactive waste, although such research is not funded by the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, even if transmutation becomes a practical technology, a repository would still likely be an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle because significant quantities of highly radioactive, long-lived materials would remain.

With regard to the potential future value of spent nuclear fuel, Section 122 of the NWPA, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10142), requires the DOE to maintain the ability to retrieve emplaced spent nuclear fuel "for an appropriate period of operation...for any reason pertaining to the public health and safety, or the environment, or for the purpose of permitting the recovery of the economically valuable contents of such spent fuel." NRC licensing regulations at 10 CFR 63.111(e) (66 FR 55806) require that the repository be designed so that any or all of the radioactive waste could be retrieved on a reasonable schedule starting at any time up to 50 years after the start of waste emplacement unless a different period is approved. The NRC must review and approve the DOE plans and design concepts for the retrieval of radioactive waste, and must determine if there is reasonable assurance that retrieval of the material could be accomplished, if required.

3.1.2 (14402) Ensign, Senator John

Comment

The other thing is that right now, the Department of Energy's Inspector General is investigating a serious conflict of interest between the DOE and one of its contractors, Winston and Strawn, who have been simultaneously representing the DOE and the leading proponent of moving waste to the state of Nevada, the Nuclear Energy Institute. Winston and Strawn, who has advocated for waste storage without proper environmental safeguards, is now advising the DOE on the highly technical licensing application, which goes to the heart of whether Yucca Mountain could shield Nevadans from harmful radiation.

I think it is outrageous for the DOE to move forward before the IG has at least finished its investigation.

Response

In its report, the Office of Inspector General did not reach any final conclusions as to whether Winston & Strawn's representation of Nuclear Energy Institute constituted a conflict of interest. The report, however, did not find any indications that Winston & Strawn's activities for, or relationship with Nuclear Energy Institute caused it to compromise the contract work or the Yucca Mountain Project.

DOE does not believe that the information developed during the period of time of Winston & Strawn's services is suspect or should be discarded as potentially biased. The scientific and technical activities associated with the characterization of the Yucca Mountain site has been performed by leading scientific and technical experts in their respective fields, including numerous representatives of national laboratories and the USGS. These activities and the results thereof have been reviewed by numerous independent oversight agencies and peer groups, including the NWTRB and the NRC, and have been made available for public review and comment during the site recommendation consideration process.

Although Winston & Strawn represented Nuclear Energy Institute on matters unrelated to a site recommendation, there is no indication that Nuclear Energy Institute or Winston & Strawn had displayed any interest in, or taken any actions, promoting short cuts or erroneous interpretations of NRC licensing regulations that would undermine the integrity of the information and data supporting any site recommendation by the Secretary or any licensing proceeding before the NRC.

3.1.2 (2432) Gibbons, Representative Jim

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. House of Representatives—Nevada	SR330007
Gibbons, Representative Jim

Representative Gibbons also co-signed two comment letters that were submitted by Senator Reid, Senator Ensign, and Representative Berkley. Responses to the comments contained in those letters can be found at Senator Reid's comments (3.1.2 (18855) and 3.1.2 (4537)).

Comment

Not enough time to review PSSE before hearings.

Should have been given a 60 day extension to comment period.

Response

The initial comment period referenced in this comment was extended from September 20, 2001, to October 19, 2001, by the DOE. At the time of closure of that comment period, the PSSE had been available for 60 days for review and comment by the public. By the end of the site recommendation comment period, October 19, 2001, the DOE had held 57 public hearings on the consideration of Yucca Mountain across Nevada's 17 counties, and in Inyo County, California, providing 165 days of public comment and 345 hours of public hearing time.

In addition, on November 14, 2001, after the NRC finalized 10 CFR Part 63 for licensing and the DOE finalized 10 CFR Part 963, the Secretary announced a supplemental 30-day comment period, including nine supplemental hearings in Nevada, to provide citizens an opportunity to comment on information that was not available at the conclusion of the initial comment period.

3.1.2 (2434) Gibbons, Representative Jim

Comment

Other technologies (i.e., transmutation and reprocessing) should be investigated.

Response

Congress has directed the DOE to study accelerator transmutation of radioactive waste, although such research is not funded by the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, even if transmutation becomes a practical technology, a repository would still likely be an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle because significant quantities of highly radioactive, long-lived materials would remain.

In the past, the DOE reprocessed spent nuclear fuel to reclaim various useful materials. Reprocessing produces several waste streams, however, which require their own waste- or resource-management technologies, including disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in a repository. Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is not consistent with United States policy at this time.

3.1.2 (2435) Gibbons, Representative Jim

Comment

No scientific concensus [sic] on transporting and storing nuclear waste.

Response

The concept of permanently disposing of nuclear waste in a deep geologic repository stems from studies initiated in the 1950s by the National Academy of Sciences. Continued studies in the United States and abroad have concluded that deep geologic disposal can keep nuclear waste isolated from the environment in geologic formations known to have been stable for millions of years, thus providing a safe location for the waste to decay.

In 1990, a panel of the National Academy of Sciences confirmed again the overall concept of geologic disposal, noting that there is "a worldwide scientific consensus that geological disposal, the approach followed by the United States, is the best option for disposing of high-level radioactive waste" [National Research Council 1990. "Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, A Position Statement of the Board on Radioactive Waste Management." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 205153. Page vii.]. The Academy in 2001 again confirmed the geologic disposal concept in a report titled "Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges." [National Research Council 2001. "Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 250101.]

In the NWPA, as amended, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to characterize the Yucca Mountain site and to report to the President on its suitability for development as a geologic repository.

The DOE will draw on comprehensive knowledge, experience, and technology in safely transporting radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel has been transported safely in the United States for over 30 years. The DOE would use casks certified by the NRC when transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NRC certifies that a cask meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 that prescribes Normal Conditions for Transport (see 10 CFR 71.71) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (see 10 CFR 71.73). These latter conditions represent the kinds of forces that a cask could encounter in a severe transportation accident. These conditions have been adopted as international safety standards by the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Numerous tests and extensive analyses, using the most advanced analytical methods available, have demonstrated that transportation casks would provide containment and shielding even under the most severe kinds of accidents. Since the publication of the DEIS, the NRC published "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates" [Sprung, J.L.; Ammerman, D.J.; Breivik, N.L.; Dukart, R.J.; Kanipe, F.L.; Koski, J.A.; Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Radloff, H.D.; Weiner, R.F.; and Yoshimura, H.R. 2000. "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates." NUREG/CR-6672. Two volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACC: MOL.20001010.0217.], a study completed by Sandia National Laboratories. Based on the revised analyses, the DOE reports in the FEIS that casks would continue to contain spent nuclear fuel fully in more than 99.99 percent of all accidents. The DOE also believes, as the FEIS reports, that the potential impacts of this transportation would be so low for individuals who live and work along the routes that these individual impacts would not be discernible even if the corresponding doses could be measured. The analysis presented in the FEIS factored in the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, the integrity of shipping casks that would be used for transportation, and the regulatory and programmatic controls that would be imposed on shipping operations (see FEIS, Appendix M). The FEIS analytical results are supported by numerous technical and scientific studies that have been compiled through decades of research and development by the DOE and other federal agencies, including the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as by the international community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Appendix J.1.4.2.1 of the FEIS presents consequences for accidents that could release radioactive materials.

3.1.2 (3789) Henderson, Mike

Commenter	Comment Document No.
From Representative Jim Gibbons' Office	SR330113
Henderson, Mike

Comment

Another element that cannot be ignored, no matter how carefully DOE reports are worded, concerns the inevitable risks associated with the location of Yucca Mountain -- only 17 miles from the Rock Valley Fault. The Rock Valley Fault is one of the most active fault lines in the U.S. and capable of earthquakes measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale.

A 1998 study at California Institute of Technology concluded that a repository site at Yucca Mountain is at least 10 times more prone to earthquakes and lava flows than government scientists previously estimated. Regrettably, the Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation's Total System Performance Assessment for the Site recommendation excludes these effects from consideration because, as they put it:

"The waste packages would not be damaged by rockfalls or vibratory ground motion.'(YMPSSE; DOE/RW-0540; xxvii)."

Response

Scientists and engineers expect that earthquakes would occur. Moreover, the NRC requires all licensed nuclear facilities to be designed and constructed to withstand natural phenomena, including earthquakes, such that their operations would not represent a threat to public health and safety. Further, the DOE recognizes that the Rock Valley fault contributes to the potential seismic hazard at Yucca Mountain. Geologic studies of the fault were carried out as part of site characterization activities, including excavation of trenches to gather evidence of past earthquakes [Coe, J.A.; Yount, J.C.; and O'Leary, D.W. 1996. "Preliminary Results of Paleoseismic Investigations of the Rock Valley Fault System." Chapter 4.13 of "Seismotectonic Framework and Characterization of Faulting at Yucca Mountain, Nevada." Whitney, J.W., ed. Milestone 3GSH100M. Denver, Colorado: U.S. Geological Survey. TIC: 237980.]. This fault has also been a focus of current seismic monitoring activities and some small, shallow earthquakes have been associated with the fault (e.g., Shields et al. 1995 [Shields, G.; Smith, K.; and Brune, J. 1995. "Source Parameters of a Sequence of Very Shallow Earthquakes in the Rock Valley Fault Zone, Southern Nevada Test Site." "Transactions of the American Geophysical Union," volume 76, p. F426. Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union. TIC: 235738.]). In carrying out its probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for Yucca Mountain [Wong, I.G. and Stepp, C. 1998. "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses for Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion at Yucca Mountain, Nevada." Milestone SP32IM3, September 23, 1998. Three volumes. Oakland, California: U.S. Geological Survey. ACC: MOL.19981207.0393.], DOE provided the six expert teams characterizing seismic sources and fault displacement with all available data on the activity of the Rock Valley fault. All six teams included the Rock Valley fault as a regional source of future seismic activity. Maximum magnitudes for the Rock Valley fault were generally assessed as between 6.5 and 7.5 [Ibid., Section 4.]. Thus, the Rock Valley fault has been appropriately characterized and included in the analysis of seismic hazard for Yucca Mountain.

The 1998 study at the California Institute of Technology referred to by the commenter was the report by Wernicke et al. [Wernicke, B.; Davis, J.L.; Bennett, R.A.; Elosegui, P.; Abolins, M.J.; Brady, R.J.; House, M.A.; Niemi, N.A.; and Snow, J.K. 1998. "Anomalous Strain Accumulation in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada." Science, volume 279, pp. 2096-2100. New York, New York: American Association for the Advancement of Science. TIC: 235956.]. This study concluded that the rate of strain in the earth's crust in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain may currently be anomalously high.

Savage et al. [Savage, J.C.; Svarc, J.L.; and Prescott, W.H. 1999. "Strain Accumulation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 1983-1998." Journal of Geophysical Research, volume 104, Issue B8, pages 17627-17631. Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union. TIC: 245645.] also examined strain data for the Yucca Mountain vicinity, and were unable to confirm the earlier results of Wernicke et al. [Wernicke et al. "Anomalous Strain Accumulation in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada."].

Recently, Wernicke and Davis [Marks, S.L. 2001. "First Report on Results from Geodetic Monitoring of the Yucca Mountain Region Using Continuous GPS Measurements—Task 1." Letter from S.L. Marks (UNLV) to R. James (DOE), August 16, 2001, with enclosures. ACC: MOL.20010924.0030. Enclosure 2.] reported results based on approximately two years of continuous global positioning system (GPS) data that show a lower strain rate than was previously reported by Wernicke et al. [Wernicke et al. "Anomalous Strain Accumulation in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada."]. These new results are generally consistent with the results of Savage et al. [Savage et al. "Strain Accumulation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 1983-1998."] and with the geologic record. It appears that the earlier results may have been affected by a transient signal related to the Little Skull Mountain earthquake of 1992 that was not appropriately accounted for in the earlier Wernicke et al. analysis [Wernicke et al. "Anomalous Strain Accumulation in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada."]. Thus, DOE believes that the seismic hazard analysis for Yucca Mountain has properly considered the information on the rate of crustal strain in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. The results of the seismic hazard analysis are utilized in evaluating the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, which is discussed in the S&ER Rev. 1 and SSE documents.

3.1.2 (12760) Henderson, Mike

Commenter	Comment Document No.
From Representative Jim Gibbons' Office	SR330063
Henderson, Mike

Comment

I appreciate the opportunity to join my fellow Nevadans in opposing the Department of Energy's plan to ship and store the nation's high-level nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

Response

DOE acknowledges the commenter's opposition to a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain.

3.1.2 (12761) Henderson, Mike

Comment

I have personally toured the world's most sensitive nuclear laboratories. Every day it seems something new and profound comes out of the research and development taking place in these laboratories, yet I am baffled that after spending a half century and billions of tax dollars, your department is on the eve of deciding that the best remedy is to dig a hole and bury this problem.

Our state legislature and local governments have been unified in their absolute opposition and still the DOE continues to dig.

Response

The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is a concern for the country as a whole, as well as the State of Nevada. The NWPA set forth a process for selecting sites for technical study as potential geologic repository locations. In accordance with this process, the DOE identified nine candidate sites, the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine sites for further consideration and DOE issued environmental assessments for the five sites. DOE recommended three of the five sites, of which Yucca Mountain was one, for study as repository site candidates. Congress amended the NWPA in 1987 and directed the Secretary of Energy to characterize only the Yucca Mountain site and report to the President on its suitability for development as a repository.

If a decision is made to make a recommendation, the President must then decide whether to recommend the site to Congress. If the President recommends the site, the State of Nevada would have 60 days in which to submit a notice of disapproval regarding the site designation. This notice of disapproval would become final unless both houses of Congress, within 90 calendar days of continuous session of Congress following receipt of the notice of disapproval from the State, pass a resolution of siting approval, and such resolution becomes law.

Congress has directed the DOE to study accelerator transmutation of radioactive waste, although such research is not funded by the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, even if transmutation becomes a practical technology, a repository would still likely be an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle because significant quantities of highly radioactive, long-lived materials would remain.

3.1.2 (13088) Henderson, Mike

Commenter	Comment Document No.
From Representative Jim Gibbons' Office	SR330113
Henderson, Mike

Comment

...I am baffled, that after spending a half-century and billions of tax dollars - your department is on the eve of deciding that the best remedy is to dig a hole and bury this problem.

Response

The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is a concern for the country as a whole, as well as the State of Nevada. The NWPA began a process for selecting sites for technical study as potential geologic repository locations. In accordance with this process, the DOE identified nine candidate sites, the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine sites for further consideration and DOE issued environmental assessments for the five sites. DOE recommended three of the five sites, of which Yucca Mountain was one, for study as repository site candidates. In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA, directing the Secretary of Energy to perform site characterization activities at the Yucca Mountain site, and, if the site is found suitable, make a recommendation to the President on whether to approve the site for development of a repository.

The concept of permanently disposing of nuclear waste in a deep geologic repository stems from studies initiated in the 1950s by the National Academy of Sciences. Continued studies in the United States and abroad have concluded that deep geologic disposal can keep nuclear waste isolated from the environment in geologic formations known to have been stable for millions of years, thus providing a safe location for the waste to decay into a stable form.

In 1990, a panel of the National Academy of Sciences confirmed again the overall concept of geologic disposal, noting that there is "a worldwide scientific consensus that geological disposal, the approach followed by the United States, is the best option for disposing of high-level radioactive waste" [National Research Council 1990. "Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, A Position Statement of the Board on Radioactive Waste Management." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 205153. Page vii.]. The Academy in 2001 again confirmed the geologic disposal concept in a report titled "Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges." [National Research Council 2001. "Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 250101.]

In the NWPA, as amended, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to characterize the Yucca Mountain site and to report to the President on its suitability for development as a geologic repository.

If a decision is made to recommend the Yucca Mountain site, the President must then decide whether to recommend the site to Congress. If the President recommends the site, the State of Nevada would have 60 days in which to submit a notice of disapproval regarding the site designation. This notice of disapproval would become final unless both houses of Congress, within 90 calendar days of continuous session of Congress following receipt of the notice of disapproval from the State, pass a resolution of siting approval, and such resolution becomes law.

3.1.2 (13123) Henderson, Mike

Comment

In late August of this year, Nevada's Congressional Delegation formally requested a delay in these hearings until our communities had adequate time to study the recently released Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation.

Based on our delegation's request and in recognition of the tragic events on September 11th, 2001, the Department of Energy delayed and expanded these hearings.

For this, I would like to thank the Secretary for his understanding and cooperation as we all grieve for our lost heroes and unify behind their families.

I only wish this pattern of respect and thoughtful consideration would continue to include every aspect of this disastrous project.

Response

The DOE attempts to accommodate the requests of the public in performing its duties under the NWPA. This Site Recommendation Comment Summary Document (CSD), along with a compilation of all comments received, would be available to support any recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site. Should a decision be made to recommend the Yucca Mountain site to the President, this document, along with other project documents, would be made available to the public and submitted to the President, along with any recommendation.

3.1.2 (13126) Henderson, Mike

Comment

...the Department of Energy, under previous administrations and still today, continues to ignore the scientific facts and warnings presented by nuclear energy experts.

Response

The DOE has always been cognizant of statements made and opinions voiced by "nuclear energy experts." In fact, the decision to consider the permanent disposal of such material in a geologic repository was based on opinions expressed by the National Academy of Sciences. Although there is always room for professional differences of opinion, the path followed by the DOE is based on a preponderance of the technical evidence developed and opinions expressed by the technical and scientific communities.

The DOE has conducted assessments of performance of the repository using an approach that was developed over more than a decade based on recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences and consistent with EPA standards and the NRC licensing regulations. This approach is defined in 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732). The approach and the results of assessments of performance of the repository have been broadly reviewed in discussions between the DOE and the NRC and by both national and international peer review groups. The models have been used to analyze scenarios selected by the DOE and those, such as water table rise, for which there are opposing views (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.3.3.1). The results have been reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and the NWTRB, and their comments and suggestions have been incorporated into the analyses, as appropriate.

3.1.2 (13128) Henderson, Mike

Comment

...the DOE has yet to officially verify corrosion rates for the spent fuel storage containers!

Response

Corrosion testing by the DOE, which has been underway for over two years, has shown the corrosion rates of Alloy 22 are very low (much less than one micrometer per year) and are near the level of detection by the standard methods, such as weight loss measurements. These low values are consistent with data in the literature from both short-term and long-term tests on Alloy 22 and related alloys. The degradation of the waste package is detailed in Section 4.2.4 of the S&ER Rev. 1. Corrosion testing of waste package materials has been conducted under conditions expected at Yucca Mountain and at conditions outside of those expected conditions to better understand the material's corrosion susceptibility. This low corrosion rate in a humid air or aqueous environment depends on the stability of the passive film on the surface. For the nickel-based Alloy 22, the film is an oxide primarily consisting of chromium with nickel, tungsten and molybdenum. Corrosion testing reported in the literature, as well as that performed by the DOE, shows that this film is stable under conditions expected at Yucca Mountain. These tests have included service-condition testing, as well as accelerated testing. Accelerated testing has included a variety of electrochemical potential tests conducted under aggressive chemistry conditions. Thus, sufficient information on the waste package exists to support any site recommendation. If the Yucca Mountain site is recommended, the DOE would continue laboratory testing throughout the preclosure period to confirm the expected waste package performance. The DOE is testing thinner specimens to reduce measurement error and is evaluating the use of sensitivity probes that would permit on-line measurements of changes to corrosion rates.

3.1.2 (13129) Henderson, Mike

Comment

Scientists familiar with the region have determined that water will percolate through the mountain and into the repository. The presence of water would obviously accelerate corrosion of the containers, leading to the release of deadly radionuclides into the environment. And still, you continue to dig.

Response

The DOE has taken the percolation of water through the mountain into consideration in the assessment of the performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain.

In a desert environment, the total amount of available water is small. A repository would be designed to complement the hydrologic environment by diverting the small flow of water that does occur away from the waste packages. Multiple natural and engineered barriers are expected to limit contact between water and waste forms, and retard radionuclide migration (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.2.1.1).

The unsaturated zone flow model simulates present and future hydrologic conditions between the ground surface and the water table (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.2.1.3.1).

Average percolation fluxes simulated within the repository footprint for three mean infiltration scenarios are 0.0046 meter per year (0.18 inch per year) for the present-day climate, 0.0124 meter per year (0.49 inch per year) for the monsoonal case, and 0.018 meter per year (0.71 inch per year) for the glacial-transition case (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.2.1.3.1.3).

Extensive laboratory and field testing, and numerical modeling have been performed to understand the effects of heat on water movement in the host rock and to develop estimates for the evolution for key environmental conditions, such as temperature and relative humidity, that could affect the performance of the engineered barriers and the transport of radionuclides that may eventually be released (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.2.1.4.2).

Based on a detailed analysis of the test data, the mean value of the general corrosion rate of the Alloy 22 after 24 months of exposure was 0.00000001 meters per year (0.0000004 inches per year). Extrapolation of the mean corrosion rate to 10,000 years implies an average penetration of the Alloy 22 of only 0.0001 meters (0.004 inches). The largest measured corrosion rate for the titanium drip shield was less than 0.00000035 meters per year (0.000014 inches per year) and would not lead to failure of the drip shield during the first 10,000 years of its lifetime (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.2.4.3.3).

Both the natural barriers and engineered barriers would work together to contribute to the overall performance of a repository. Natural barriers limit the amount of water that could contact the waste and provide a geochemical environment that prevents mobilization and transport of most species of radionuclides. Equally important, there would be little percolation of water down through the rock layers to the repository block even during cooler, wetter periods. Engineered barriers would also limit the amount of water that could contact the waste; moreover, the waste package would contain many species of radionuclides until they decay away. For example, strontium-90 and cesium-137 would have decayed away after the first 1,000 years. Far in the future, should the waste package breach and water dissolve the cladding and waste form, the movement of the long-lived radionuclides would be retarded by the physical and chemical properties of the geologic setting. Additionally, of those few species that are mobile, natural conditions of the unsaturated rock, as well as zeolites in the rock layers underlying the repository, would retard the migration of many species of radionuclides. Many species would sorb onto the zeolites and thus provide additional delay to allow additional time for these species of radionuclides to decay away. Thus, the natural and engineered barriers working together would prevent the vast majority of radionuclide species from reaching the accessible environment.

The DOE has constructed the Exploratory Studies Facility to be able to study the characteristics of the Yucca Mountain site. The DOE has not initiated construction of a repository, which is contingent upon the site first being designated and then a construction authorization issued by the NRC.

3.1.2 (13133) Henderson, Mike

Comment

It does not take a scientist to know that a tangible danger with seismic activity involves not only falling rock or ground vibrations, but also the water table, which is 300 meters below the proposed repository.

Even former senior DOE geologist Jerry Szymanski has found that an earthquake could dramatically elevate the water table, potentially flooding the repository.

Response

Available evidence indicates that earthquakes would not cause the elevation of the water table to rise sufficiently to inundate the repository. One way to estimate future behavior is by examining the past. The DOE has examined the geologic history of Yucca Mountain and has found that the site area is geologically stable with little fault movement during the past two million years and that there is an extremely low probability of future seismic activity within the proposed waste emplacement area for 10,000 years (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 1.3.2.2.2). In particular, Section 1.3.2.2.3 of the S&ER Rev. 1 indicates that there were only a few meters of movement along major block bounding faults during the past 10 million years. Yucca Mountain, therefore, is considered to be located in a region of low to moderate seismicity, and given the evidence of past geologic stability, it is reasonable to expect a similar environment for the next million years or more (see Section 4.3.2.2 of the S&ER Rev. 1).

Szymanski [Szymanski 1989. "Conceptual Considerations of the Yucca Mountain Groundwater System with Special Emphasis on the Adequacy of This System to Accommodate a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository." Three volumes. Las Vegas, Nevada: U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office. ACC: NNA.19890831.0152.] proposed that earthquakes could result in stress release in an extensional tectonic environment. This release is postulated to reduce fracture apertures, resulting in water being forced upward. For more discussion of this subject see Section 4.3.3.1 of the S&ER Rev. 1. A group of 23 project scientists reviewed this hypothesis and concluded that it was not supported by available information. In addition, the National Research Council established a panel that reviewed the pertinent literature and data available up to 1992. This panel consulted with scientists involved in related field and laboratory studies. The panel concluded that none of the evidence offered as proof of groundwater upwelling in and around Yucca Mountain could reasonably be attributed to that process [National Research Council 1992. "Ground Water at Yucca Mountain: How High Can It Rise? Final Report of the Panel on Coupled Hydrologic/Tectonic/Hydrothermal Systems at Yucca Mountain." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC:204931.].

Section 9.4.4.3 of the YMSD provides a detailed discussion of the influence of earthquakes on the level of the water table at Yucca Mountain. These effects would tend to be relatively small (on the order of less than one meter).

The DOE also examined the cumulative effects on the elevation of the water table resulting from a wetter climate, earthquakes, and a volcanic eruption, in various combinations. The evidence indicates that no reasonable combination of wetter climates, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions could raise the elevation of the water table sufficiently to inundate the waste emplacement area (see S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.3.3.1).

3.1.2 (13134) Henderson, Mike

Comment

...the Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation also clearly states:

The most important residual uncertainty in the TSPA analyses may be in projecting the long-term performance of engineered barriers using data from short-term laboratory tests. Also important are the inherent uncertainties in forecasting changes in climate, certain aspects of seismicity, and other geologic processes over the specified period of compliance (YMPSSE; DOE/RW-0504; xxix).

Indeed, those inherent uncertainties are very important to everyone in Nevada and across the country; uncertainties that nobody, especially the federal government, should ignore.

Response

The DOE has developed a conservative approach to compensate for uncertainty in data, processes, and models, and this approach results in a performance assessment that bounds the possible behavior of the repository. The approach provides the DOE with confidence that a repository at Yucca Mountain could be designed, constructed, operated, and closed while protecting the health and safety of the public. The range of results from performance assessments described in the S&ER Rev. 1 and the SSPA Volumes 1 and 2 provide the expectation that the doses would likely be below the NRC's radiation protection standards for licensing.

The S&ER Rev. 1 describes estimates of the future environmental effects of operating and closing a repository. The descriptions of these estimates include statements about the uncertainty in them (S&ER Rev. 1, Section 4.1). The SSPA Volumes 1 and 2 investigates uncertainty and sensitivity in performance more fully. These documents and, in turn, their referenced technical documents (such as process model reports and analysis model reports), contain extensive detail on a large number of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses that were conducted to define the individual contribution of specific uncertainties.

The DOE has organized an internal task force to evaluate the sufficiency of the treatment of uncertainty at the process (scientific) and system (modeling) levels. The SSPA discussion of uncertainty and its treatment in Volumes 1 and 2 benefited from this review. Additional sensitivity and uncertainty analyses were conducted in the SSPA Volumes 1 and 2 to investigate previously unquantified uncertainty and to remove some of the conservatism from the TSPA-SR model. An extensive amount of analyses on the unsaturated zone flux and seepage into the drifts is reported in Volume 1, Sections 3 and 4 and in Volume 2, Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of the SSPA. The results of these analyses removed some of the conservatism from the supplemental model that reduced the peak dose beyond the 10,000-year postclosure period (SSPA Vol. 2, Section 4.1). Differences in the results prior to 10,000 years are caused by the assumed failure of 3 or less waste packages due to assumed, undetected improper heat treatment of the final closure weld.

With regard to underestimating potential risk, the DOE acknowledges that it is not possible to forecast with certainty what would occur hundreds or thousands of years in the future. However, confidence in the disposal techniques is based on a defense-in-depth that, for example, places drip shields over waste packages to account for uncertainties. The DOE has adopted an assessment approach that explicitly considers the spatial and temporal variability and inherent uncertainties in geologic and biological components. The bases of the approach are summarized below:

1. The site description is based on extensive underground exploratory studies and investigations of the surface environment.

2. A preliminary design is based on laboratory investigations and conceptual engineering studies.

3. The features, events, and processes (FEPs) that could affect the long-term performance of the repository are identified and included in the performance assessment model.

4. Evaluation of a wide range of exposure scenarios has been conducted, including the normal evolution of the disposal system under the expected thermal, hydrologic, chemical, and mechanical conditions; altered conditions due to natural processes such as changes in climate; human intrusion; activities such as the use of water supply wells, and irrigation of crops; low-probability events such as volcanoes, earthquakes, and nuclear criticality.

5. Development of alternative conceptual and numerical models to represent the FEPs of a particular scenario and to simulate system performance for that scenario.

6. Parameter distributions are used to represent the possible change of the system over the long term, and use of conservative assessments leads to overestimation of effects when there is insufficient information for use of a probability distribution.

7. Performance of sensitivity analyses.

8. Extensive peer review and oversight of the performance assessment approach and results.

This approach, combined with extensive sensitivity analyses and broad peer review and oversight, ensures that the effects of the repository are bounded. The DOE has demonstrated that this process results in a reasonable estimation of impacts and is sufficient for comparing the relative merits of the various repository scenarios.

When a waste package fails, the release of radionuclides is controlled by the amount of water and the solubility of the radionuclides involved. There are three radionuclides that would contribute significantly to the peak dose from a repository. These are neptunium-237, technetium-99, and iodine-129 (SSPA Vol. 2, Section 4.1). Of these radionuclides, technetium-99 and iodine-129 are highly soluble and travel with the groundwater. The release of neptunium-237 from a failed package is controlled by its solubility (e.g., the more water that passes through a waste package, the more neptunium that is released). For increased water movement, the technetium-99 and iodine-129 would not be released any faster because of their high solubility, but more neptunium-237 would be released. There would be a small decrease in dose due to dilution of the highly soluble radionuclides, which would be offset by increased release of neptunium-237, and the doses would remain about the same. This is evident on the million year plots of the nominal case results, where climate change appears as small spikes on the dose curves (SSPA Vol. 2, Section 4.1).

The DOE has been performing corrosion rates measurements from samples obtained from the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, the DOE has performed linear polarization resistance measurements to obtain corrosion rates at similar and more aggressive conditions. These rates were low, much less than one micron per year. New micro-analytical techniques are being utilized to better quantify the corrosion rates. These include high sensitivity corrosion probes, atomic force microscopy, x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, electrochemical impedance spectroscopy and linear polarization.

Testing by the DOE, which has been underway for over two years, has shown the corrosion rates are very low (much less than one micrometer per year) and are near the level of detection by the standard methods, such as weight loss measurements. These low values are consistent with data in the literature from both short-term and long-term tests on Alloy 22 and related alloys. The degradation of the waste package is described in Section 4.2.4 of the S&ER Rev. 1. Corrosion of waste package materials has been conducted under conditions expected at Yucca Mountain and more extreme conditions to better understand the material's corrosion susceptibility. This low corrosion rate in a humid air or aqueous environment depends on the stability of the passive film on the surface. For the nickel-based Alloy 22, the film is an oxide primarily consisting of chromium with nickel, tungsten and molybdenum. Corrosion testing reported in the literature, as well as that performed by the DOE, shows that this film is stable under conditions expected at Yucca Mountain. These tests have included service-condition testing, as well as accelerated testing. Accelerated testing has included a variety of electrochemical potential tests conducted under aggressive chemistry conditions. Thus, sufficient information exists to support any site recommendation. The DOE would continue laboratory testing throughout the preclosure period to confirm the expected waste package performance, including continued testing in the Long-Term Corrosion Test Facility; adding new 'bounding water' test environments to the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility; installing thinner test coupons to decrease measurement error; installing high sensitivity corrosion probes; and performing materials corrosion testing during the performance confirmation period.

An operational plan for the Yucca Mountain repository would provide for a design and management approach that isolates wastes from the public in the future while allowing flexibility to preserve options for modifying emplacement and retrieving the waste. This design would maintain the ability to retrieve emplaced materials for at least 50 years after emplacement unless the NRC specifies a different time period. Another part of the DOE approach is a commitment to a performance confirmation program, as provided in 10 CFR Part 63. This program would extend beyond the possible recommendation of the site and to permanent closure.

3.1.2 (13135) Henderson, Mike

Comment

Another issue the Department has not addressed to my satisfaction is the transportation of nuclear waste along America's commuter highways. The Department of Energy's "Multi-Purpose Canister" proposal indicates that approximately 6,200 truck shipments and 9,400 rail cask shipments will move through 43 states. This high-level nuclear waste caravan will traverse our nation's interstates and railways from nuclear power plants for the next 30 years.

This means that our communities, neighborhoods, households, schools, hospitals and churches may have this deadly substance travelling right outside their front doors - nonstop - for 3 decades.

With the remarkable advances in technology taking place in our nation's nuclear laboratories, it seems to me that 30 years of unabated nuclear traffic is an unnecessary and careless solution.

Response

The DOE will draw on comprehensive knowledge, experience, and technology in safely transporting radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel has been transported safely in the United States for over 30 years. The DOE has identified in the FEIS the mostly rail as its preferred mode of transportation both nationally and in the State of Nevada.

Contrary to the image created by the comment, any spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would not be transported in a constant, never-ending stream of trucks or rail cars. Rather, under the "mostly rail" scenario preferred by the DOE, a limited number of vehicles would be in service at any one time and traversing different routes toward their final destination. Even as they neared that destination, typically no more than one loaded truck per week or one loaded rail car per train per day would pass a specific location.

Figure 6-14 of the FEIS identifies potential Nevada rail routes to Yucca Mountain and an estimated number of shipments for each route. Section J.3.1.2 of the FEIS, Appendix J, lists studies of potential rail alignments from which the DOE identified the five rail corridors analyzed in the FEIS. Section J.3, Nevada Transportation, of the FEIS also discusses the screening approach for the five identified corridors and why the DOE chose to analyze them.

The DOE expects that some spent nuclear fuel would be transported by the highway mode (truck). Prior transportation analyses provide substantial evidence that the environmental impacts for truck, rail, and barge modes of transportation that might be used would be small (see FEIS, Table 1-1).

3.1.2 (13136) Henderson, Mike

Comment

A 1985 DOE contractor report concluded that an accident involving a singular, high level nuclear waste cask could result in the release of deadly amounts of radioactive materials in the environment. According to the study, release of only a small fraction of the cask's contents in a rural area would be sufficient to contaminate a 42 square-mile area.

The estimated cost of cleanup after such an accident was estimated to be between $176 million and $19.4 billion (depending primarily upon permissible post-accident soil concentrations and upon regulatory requirements for disposal of contaminated soil).

Cleanup after a similar accident in a typical urban area would obviously be considerably more expensive and time consuming.

Mr. Secretary, please realize that these figures do not reflect the intangible cost of human life and health. Our first priority as elected officials is to ensure the public's health and safety, and this policy fails to achieve this goal.

The Department of Energy cannot continue to ignore the substantial ramifications of a potential disaster.

Response

As stated in the 1985 report "Exposures and Health Effects from Spent Fuel Transportation" [Sandquist, G.M.; Rogers, V.C.; Sutherland, A.A.; and Merrell, G.B. 1985. "Exposures and Health Effects from Spent Fuel Transportation." RAE-8339/12-1. Salt Lake City, Utah: Rogers and Associates Engineering. TIC: 200593. Page 3-2.], "the probability of spent fuel transportation accident that results in the release of radioactive materials into the environment is estimated to be no greater than 2 occurrences in a million rail transport accidents." The study was meant to provide rapid and generic estimates of risks to individual populations from transportation of spent nuclear fuel. The assumptions used in the report tend to be very conservative. As expected at the time of the report, more detailed transportation analyses would be performed as a part of a repository environmental impact statement.

To date, numerous tests and extensive analyses, using the most advanced analytical methods available, have demonstrated that casks would provide containment and shielding even under the most severe kinds of accidents. Since the publication of the DEIS, the NRC published "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates" [Sprung, J.L.; Ammerman, D.J.; Breivik, N.L.; Dukart, R.J.; Kanipe, F.L.; Koski, J.A.; Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Radloff, H.D.; Weiner, R.F.; and Yoshimura, H.R. 2000. "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates." NUREG/CR-6672. Two volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACC: MOL.20001010.0217.], a study completed by Sandia National Laboratories. Based on the revised analyses, the DOE has concluded in the FEIS that casks would continue to contain spent nuclear fuel fully in more than 99.99 percent of all accidents. After initial safety precautions had been taken, the cask would be recovered and removed from the accident scene. Because no radioactive materials would be released, based on reported experience with two previous accidents [FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 2000. "Guidance for Developing State, Tribal, and Local Radiological Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents." FEMA REP-5, Rev. 02. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency. Appendix G, Case 4 and Case 5.], the economic costs of these accidents would be minimal.

For the 0.01 percent of accidents severe enough to cause a release of radioactive materials from a cask, a number of interrelated factors would affect costs of cleaning up resulting radioactive contamination after the accident. Included are: the severity of the accident and the initial level of contamination; the weather at the time and following; the location and size of the affected land area and how the land is used; the standard established for the allowable level of residual contamination following cleanup and the decontamination method used; and the technical requirements for and location for disposal of contaminated materials.

Because it would be necessary to specify each of the factors to estimate clean up costs, any estimate for a single accident would be highly uncertain and speculative. Nonetheless, to provide a gauge of the costs that could be incurred the DOE examined past studies of costs of cleanup following hypothetical accidents that would involve uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials in the FEIS, Section J.1.4.2.5. Included in the review was the 1985 report "Exposures and Health Effects from Spent Fuel Transportation" [Sandquist et al. "Exposures and Health Effects from Spent Fuel Transportation."]. The extreme high estimates of contaminated land area contained in the report are based on assumptions that all factors combine in the most disadvantageous way to create a "worst case" (e.g., a hypothetical rail cask accident postulated in the report "Exposures and Health Effects from Spent Fuel Transportation" [Ibid.] estimates a release of radioactive isotopes that would cause land contamination approximately two orders of magnitude greater than the FEIS estimated for a maximally reasonably foreseeable accident for a mostly rail scenario). Such worst cases are not reasonably foreseeable.

Cost data used in the studies reviewed in FEIS Section J.1.4.2.5 included data compiled from case studies involving actual cleanup of radioactive contamination. The studies also address consequences for releases of radioactive materials in communities.

Although the studies project high costs for cleanup following severe accidents, the accidents evaluated would be very unlikely and, as a consequence, the DOE believes the economic risks of transportation accidents are very small. The shipping casks used to transport spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would be massive with design features that comply with regulatory requirements that would ensure the casks performed their safety functions even when damaged. Furthermore, the high-level radioactive waste would be in a solid (ceramics, metals, or glass) form that would not be easily dispersed.

The DOE anticipates that the economic costs of accidents where there would be no release of radioactive material would not be substantial. The health and safety consequences of a maximum reasonably foreseeable transportation accident are discussed in Section 6.2.4.2 of the FEIS. The FEIS analysis did not include the restorative effects of postaccident recovery, remediation, or cleanup in estimating the health and safety impacts, and would, therefore, tend to overestimate, rather than underestimate, actual radiological impacts.

The Price–Anderson Act indemnifies liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation, including all reasonable additional costs incurred by a state or a political subdivision of a state, in the course of responding to a nuclear incident or a precautionary evacuation. The Price–Anderson Act established a system of private insurance and federal indemnification for persons who may be liable for and compensation for persons who may be injured by a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation codified at 42 U.S.C. Sections 2014 and 2210. The Price–Anderson Act generally ensures that up to $9.43 billion is available to compensate for personal injury and property damage suffered by the public from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation regardless of who caused the injury or damage. The current amount of $9.43 billion for DOE contractual activities and for large power plants licensed by the NRC reflects a threshold level beyond which Congress would review the need for additional payment of claims in the case of a nuclear incident with catastrophic damage.

DOE must include an agreement of indemnification in each DOE contract that involves the risk of public liability for a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation. This indemnification (1) provides omnibus coverage of all persons who might be legally liable, (2) indemnifies fully all legal liability up to the statutory limit on such liability (currently $9.43 billion for a nuclear incident in the United States), (3) covers all DOE contractual activity that might result in a nuclear incident in the United States, (4) is not subject to the usual limitation on the availability of appropriated funds, and (5) is mandatory and exclusive.

3.1.2 (13137) Henderson, Mike

Comment

Even former Department employees are speaking out against this Project. Earlier this year, a former DOE official publicly announced that plans for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain should be abandoned. W. Kenneth Davis, an energy undersecretary from 1981-1983, had proposed the Yucca Mountain repository site under the Reagan Administration. But now, after several years of further study on this issue, Mr. Davis maintains that shipping deadly nuclear waste across the country to Yucca Mountain is a terribly flawed and misguided effort.

He said, Yucca Mountain as a waste repository is not a reasonable view, and in my opinion should be put in mothballs.

Response

Based on the results of the impact analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Appendix J of the FEIS, as well as the results published in numerous other studies and environmental impact analyses cited in the FEIS, the DOE is confident spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste can be safely transported to Yucca Mountain. Numerous tests and extensive analyses, using the most advanced analytical methods available, have demonstrated that transportation casks would provide containment and shielding even under the most severe kinds of accidents. Since the publication of the DEIS, the NRC published "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates" [Sprung, J.L.; Ammerman, D.J.; Breivik, N.L.; Dukart, R.J.; Kanipe, F.L.; Koski, J.A.; Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Radloff, H.D.; Weiner, R.F.; and Yoshimura, H.R. 2000. "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates." NUREG/CR-6672. Two volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACC: MOL.20001010.0217.], a study completed by Sandia National Laboratories. Based on the revised analyses, the DOE has concluded in the FEIS that casks would continue to contain spent nuclear fuel fully in more than 99.99 percent of all accidents. The DOE also believes, as the FEIS reports that the potential impacts of this transportation would be so low for individuals who live and work along the routes that these individual impacts would not be discernible even if the corresponding doses from such shipments could be measured. The analysis presented in the FEIS factored in the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, the integrity of shipping casks that would be used for transportation, and the regulatory and programmatic controls that would be imposed on shipping operations (see FEIS, Appendix M). The FEIS analytical results are supported by numerous technical and scientific studies that have been compiled through decades of research and development by the DOE and other federal agencies, including the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as by the international community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Appendix J.1.4.2.1 of the FEIS presents consequences for accidents that could release radioactive materials.

3.1.2 (9947) Jaczko, Greg

Commenter	Comment Document No.
From Senator Harry Reid's Office	SR330044
Jaczko, Greg

Comment

As you all know, this process is flawed. We do not have a Final Environmental Impact Statement.

Response

Based on more than 20 years of scientific investigations and analyses described in such documents as the FEIS, the S&ER Rev. 1, and the SSE, the DOE concludes that it has sufficient information to estimate potential impacts from the construction, operation, and monitoring, and eventual closure of a repository at Yucca Mountain.

The FEIS, which includes the public comments on the DEIS and the SDEIS, and responses to those comments, must be included as part of a comprehensive statement of the basis for any recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site. In the event of a site recommendation, this comprehensive statement will be submitted to the President and made available to the public. In addition, consistent with the requirement that the Secretary receive comments from the public regarding a possible decision, as specified in Section 114 of the NWPA, the DOE has conducted an extensive public comment process for the site recommendation in an effort to ensure consideration of the views of the public. Responses to all comments received during the site recommendation comment period have been developed and are provided in this CSD that would be available to support any recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site.

3.1.2 (9948) Jaczko, Greg

Comment

We do not have finalized Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy siting guidelines.

Response

Since this comment was made, the final NRC rules establishing 10 CFR Part 63, Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, were promulgated for licensing at 66 FR 55732 on November 2, 2001. In addition, the DOE promulgated 10 CFR Part 963, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, at 66 FR 57298 on November 14, 2001.

3.1.2 (9950) Jaczko, Greg

Comment

In the coming weeks and months, the fight over Yucca Mountain will necessarily focus on the issues of waste transportation. I urge you and others who oppose Yucca Mountain to take up the grave challenge of protecting America from the unsafe shipment of deadly radioactive waste. It is not necessary. It has not been proven safe.

Response

The DOE will draw on comprehensive knowledge, experience, and technology in safely transporting radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel has been transported safely in the United States for over 30 years. The DOE would use casks certified by the NRC when transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NRC certifies that a cask meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 that prescribes Normal Conditions for Transport (see 10 CFR 71.71) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (see 10 CFR 71.73). These latter conditions represent the kinds of forces that a cask could encounter in a severe transportation accident. These conditions have been adopted as international safety standards by the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Numerous tests and extensive analyses, using the most advanced analytical methods available, have demonstrated that transportation casks would provide containment and shielding even under the most severe kinds of accidents. Since the publication of the DEIS, the NRC published "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates," [Sprung, J.L.; Ammerman, D.J.; Breivik, N.L.; Dukart, R.J.; Kanipe, F.L.; Koski, J.A.; Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Radloff, H.D.; Weiner, R.F.; and Yoshimura, H.R. 2000. "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates." NUREG/CR-6672. Two volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACC: MOL.20001010.0217.], a study completed by Sandia National Laboratories. Based on the revised analyses, the DOE reports in the FEIS that casks would continue to contain spent nuclear fuel fully in more than 99.99 percent of all accidents. The DOE also believes, as the FEIS reports, that the potential impacts of this transportation would be so low for individuals who live and work along the routes that these individual impacts would not be discernible even if the corresponding doses could be measured. The analysis presented in the FEIS factored in the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, the integrity of shipping casks that would be used for transportation, and the regulatory and programmatic controls that would be imposed on shipping operations (see FEIS, Appendix M). The FEIS analytical results are supported by numerous technical and scientific studies that have been compiled through decades of research and development by the DOE and other federal agencies, including the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as by the international community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Appendix J.1.4.2.1 of the FEIS presents consequences for accidents that could release radioactive materials.

3.1.2 (9951) Jaczko, Greg

Comment

It would be vulnerable to terrorist attack....

Response

The physical security measures already in place by the NRC and the exceptional strength and durability of the transportation casks would protect shipments of radioactive waste from acts of terrorism or sabotage. The same design features that make transportation casks capable of surviving severe accidents also limit their vulnerability to sabotage. Also, programs and processes to guard against potential sabotage would be developed by the DOE and submitted to the NRC for review and approval before any spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste is transported to Yucca Mountain.

3.1.2 (2410) Reid, Senator Harry

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. Senate—Nevada	SR330006
Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

Hearing attendees had to go through three security checks to enter hearing.

Hearing is not fair.

Asked for the comment period to be extended for 60 days and only got 15-day extension.

Hearings are being held before release of the FEIS.

Response

The DOE makes an effort to hold public hearings at locations and times that are most convenient for the general public. For the September 5, 2001, Las Vegas hearing, the meeting was moved to a DOE facility when the hotel originally scheduled for the meeting decided its facilities would not accommodate the expected attendance. Security officers were stationed at three points at the DOE facility to direct the public to parking spaces and the meeting room. These positions may have been mistaken for security checks by some attendees, however, none of the positions was established, nor did they function, as security checks.

The format of the public meetings is designed to ensure that any member of the public wishing to speak may do so. Oral comments were initially limited to 5 minutes to permit maximum participation by those in attendance; however, individuals requiring additional time were typically given the opportunity to finalize their remarks after completion of commentary by other participants or to provide those comments to a court reporter located outside the hearing room.

The comment period of 165 days began on May 7, 2001, was extended by the Secretary as a result of public comments, and closed on October 19, 2001. The large amount of information developed by the DOE on the Yucca Mountain site was made available in stages to provide the public with ample time to review all the available materials and formulate their comments regarding a possible site recommendation by the Secretary.

The FEIS, which includes the response to public comments on the DEIS and SDEIS, will be available to support any recommendation regarding the Yucca Mountain site.

3.1.2 (2411) Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

Most difficult thing is transportation. Waste will pass through 46 states past schools, businesses and bedrooms. But DOE won't tell the routes.

Response

The DOE will draw on comprehensive knowledge, experience, and technology in safely transporting radioactive materials. Spent nuclear fuel has been transported safely in the United States for over 30 years. In response to public comments on the DEIS, the DOE has added maps of the representative routes analyzed in the FEIS and the potential number of shipments through each state to Appendix J.4 of the FEIS.

For purposes of analysis in the FEIS, the DOE identified representative highway routes consistent with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations, which require the use of preferred routes (Interstate system highway, beltway or bypass, and state or tribal designated alternate) that reduce time in transit. The DOE identified representative rail lines for analysis based on current rail practices, as there are no comparable federal regulations applicable to the selection of rail lines for the shipment of radioactive materials. At this time, many years before shipments could begin, it is impossible to identify with a reasonable degree of accuracy which highway or rail lines would be used. For example, state or Native American tribal governments could designate alternate preferred highway routes, and new highways and rail lines could be constructed or modified. As discussed in Appendix M of the FEIS, the DOE would provide a draft transportation plan for review and comment, identifying proposed transportation routes to the states and tribes through whose jurisdictions spent nuclear fuel would be shipped. After consideration of stakeholder comments the DOE would finalize route selections and submit them to the NRC for approval. The DOE would identify shipping routes approximately five years before the shipments would begin.

3.1.2 (2412) Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

Many train problems: City of Baltimore closed for 5 days, truck carrying LLW had a spill.

Response

Based on the results of the impact analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Appendix J of the FEIS, as well as the results published in numerous other studies and environmental impact analyses cited in the FEIS, the DOE is confident that spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste could be safely transported to Yucca Mountain. The DOE also believes, as the FEIS reports, that the potential impacts of this transportation would be so low for individuals who lived and worked along the routes that these individual impacts would not be discernible even if the corresponding doses from such shipments could be measured. The analysis presented in the FEIS factored in the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, the integrity of shipping casks that would be used for transportation, and the regulatory and programmatic controls that would be imposed on shipping operations (see FEIS, Appendix M). The FEIS analytic results are supported by numerous technical and scientific studies that have been compiled through decades of research and development by the DOE and other federal agencies of the United States, including the NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as by the international community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The shipping casks used to transport these materials are massive, with design features that comply with regulatory requirements to ensure that the casks perform their safety functions even when damaged. Numerous tests and extensive analyses, using the most advanced analytical methods available, have demonstrated that these types of shipping casks would provide containment and shielding even under the most severe kinds of accidents. Since the publication of the DEIS, the NRC published "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates" [Sprung, J.L.; Ammerman, D.J.; Breivik, N.L.; Dukart, R.J.; Kanipe, F.L.; Koski, J.A.; Mills, G.S.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Radloff, H.D.; Weiner, R.F.; and Yoshimura, H.R. 2000. "Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates." NUREG/CR-6672. Two volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACC: MOL.20001010.0217.], a study completed by Sandia National Laboratories. Based on the revised analyses, the DOE has concluded in the FEIS that casks would continue to contain spent nuclear fuel fully in more than 99.99 percent of all accidents. This means that of the approximately 53,000 truck shipments over 24 years in a "mostly truck" scenario, an estimated 66 accidents nationwide could occur, each having less than a 0.01 percent chance that radioactive materials would be released. The chance of a rail accident that would cause a release from a cask would be even less. The corresponding chance that such an accident would occur in any particular locale would be extremely low. Section J.1.4.2.1 of the FEIS reports potential consequences for accidents that could release radioactive materials.

"Real life" transportation accidents involve collisions of many kinds, such as with other vehicles and obstacles, that could result in fires and explosions, inundation, or burial of a cask containing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. These accidents are caused in turn by a variety of initiating events including human error, mechanical failure, and natural causes such as earthquakes. Accidents occur in many different kinds of places including mountain passes and urban areas, rural freeways in open landscapes, and rail switching yards.

The combinations of accident conditions, initiating events, and locations is very large. Analyzing an extensive array of accident scenarios is neither practical nor meaningful. However, it is meaningful to analyze a range of reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios that consider, in effect, common initiating events and conditions having similar characteristics. Thus, for example, the FEIS analyzes the impacts of various collision accidents in which a cask would be exposed to a range of impact velocities (see FEIS, Section J.1.4.2.1).

The FEIS also analyzes a maximum reasonable foreseeable accident, an accident with a probability of occurrence of about 3 in 10 million per year. To put this in perspective, this accident would occur once in the course of about 5 billion legal-weight truck shipments. In this scenario, a truck cask, not involved in a collision, would be engulfed in a fire with temperatures between 750 degrees Celsius and 1,000 degrees Celsius (1,400 degrees Fahrenheit to 1,800 degrees Fahrenheit) (see FEIS, Section 6.2.4.2). The conditions of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident analyzed in the FEIS envelope conditions reported for the Baltimore Tunnel fire (a train derailment and fire that occurred in July 2001 in a tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland). Temperatures in that fire were reported to be as high as 820 degrees Celsius (1,500 degrees Fahrenheit).

3.1.2 (2413) Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

DOE Inspector General is investigating serious potential conflict of interest between contractor (Winston & Strawn) and DOE.

Response

In its report, the Office of Inspector General did not include any formal findings of wrong-doing on the part of Winston & Strawn.

DOE does not believe that the information developed during the period of time of Winston & Strawn's services is suspect or should be discarded as potentially biased. The scientific and technical activities associated with the characterization of the Yucca Mountain site has been performed by leading scientific and technical experts in their respective fields, including numerous representatives of national laboratories and the USGS. These activities and the results thereof have been reviewed by numerous independent oversight agencies and peer groups, including the NWTRB and the NRC, and have been made available for public review and comment during the site recommendation consideration process.

Although Winston & Strawn represented the Nuclear Energy Institute on matters unrelated to a site recommendation, there is no indication that the Nuclear Energy Institute or Winston & Strawn had displayed any interest in, or taken any actions, promoting short cuts or erroneous interpretations of NRC licensing regulations that would undermine the integrity of the information and data supporting any site recommendation by the Secretary or any licensing proceeding before the NRC.

3.1.2 (2415) Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

We may not need Yucca Mountain in the first place. It is absolutely safe to leave the waste where it is in dry storage casks.

There is a need for more investigation of "recycling" (accelerator transmutation).

Fuel rods contain a lot of energy. Doesn't make sense to bury them. We can convert it.

Response

Recognizing that the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel from commercial and naval nuclear reactors and high-level radioactive waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and defense activities has created the need for a national solution, Congress enacted the NWPA (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.). The NWPA provides for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to protect the public health and safety and the environment. With the passage of the NWPA, the national policy for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste was defined to be geologic disposal.

The purpose of a repository is permanent disposal rather than indeterminate storage. The concept of permanently disposing of radioactive waste in a deep geologic repository stems from studies initiated in the 1950s by the National Academy of Sciences. Continued studies here and abroad have concluded that deep geologic disposal can keep radioactive waste isolated from the environment in geologic formations known to have been stable for millions of years, thus providing a safe location for the waste to decay into a stable form.

Commercial nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons production, operation of naval reactors, and research and development activities produce spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. As of December 1999, the United States had generated about 40,000 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants. By 2035, the United States will also have about 2,500 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel from research reactors, naval reactors, reactor prototypes, and reactors that produced nuclear weapons materials. This spent nuclear fuel is currently stored at DOE and commercial reactor sites around the country. In addition, about 380 million liters (100 million gallons) of liquid waste from nuclear weapons production are stored in underground tanks at many of these same DOE sites. This waste would have to be solidified prior to shipment to a repository.

At-reactor spent nuclear fuel storage systems, such as spent fuel pools, have been operated for decades without undue risk to the general public or nuclear plant personnel. Fuel pools, by design, include active systems. However, such systems require continuous technical and management oversight of a substantial amount of process equipment (such as water-cooling, water-treatment, and leak-detection systems). Moreover, according to utility reports, the pools at many reactor sites already have or soon will run out of storage space. In order to avoid potential premature shutdowns and a significant loss of electrical generating capability, a number of utilities have decided to add dry storage systems to provide additional onsite storage. While dry storage systems do not require active components to keep the spent fuel cool, such systems must be routinely monitored to ensure compliance with regulatory standards. In addition, 24-hour security must be provided to safeguard the stored materials. Such at-reactor storage systems were not designed for permanent storage.

The possibility that changing conditions, both scientific and societal, could affect long-term decisions regarding continued use of a repository was recognized during development of repository regulations and during initial repository design. To maintain flexibility and an ability to respond to changing conditions and technologies, Section 122 of the NWPA (42 U.S.C. 10142) requires retrievability at a geologic repository. 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732) requires that the repository design preserve the option of retrieval on a reasonable schedule for as long as 50 years after the start of waste emplacement or some other period approved by the NRC. In accordance with these requirements, the operational plan for the Yucca Mountain repository allows the flexibility to preserve options for modifying emplacement and retrieving waste prior to closure. This design would maintain the ability to retrieve emplaced materials for at least 50 years, in the event of a decision to retrieve the waste either to protect the public health and safety or the environment, or to recover resources from spent nuclear fuel. During this period, the repository would remain accessible for continued testing and monitoring while providing flexibility to future generations, who would conduct repository performance confirmation and ultimately determine the timing and methods of repository closure.

Congress has directed the DOE to study accelerator transmutation of radioactive waste, although such research is not funded by the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, even if transmutation becomes a practical technology, a repository would still likely be an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle because significant quantities of highly radioactive, long-lived materials would remain.

In the past, the DOE reprocessed spent nuclear fuel to reclaim various useful materials. Under present policy, the DOE has halted routine spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Reprocessing produces several waste streams, however, which require their own waste- or resource-management technologies, including disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in a repository.

3.1.2 (3093) Reid, Senator Harry

Commenter	Comment Document No.
U.S. Senate—Nevada	SR330023
Reid, Senator Harry

Comment

I am writing to express my profound concern and sincere disappointment with the ongoing Yucca Mountain site suitability recommendation process being conducted by your Department of Energy (DOE). As you know, Yucca Mountain, Nevada is being considered for development as a spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste geologic repository. What you may not know are the disturbing details of how the DOE is manipulating the process in contravention of sound science and sound public policy.

The hearing last night was a poor attempt to gauge public sentiment in Nevada regarding the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. I am particularly troubled by numerous complaints I have received about the hearing. First, I understand that the relatively inaccessible location of the site at the Department of Energy's office in North Las Vegas prevented many Nevadans from attending. Second, the public had to run a gauntlet of fences and guards just to get into the hearing and the facility was too small for the number of people who wanted to participate. Finally, many potential participants were unable to remain for the duration of the seven and one-half hour hearing due to childcare and other family responsibilities and were therefore denied their opportunity to comment on the plan in person.

The NWPA of 1982 explicitly requires DOE to hold public meetings in Nevada to hear from Nevadans. The Secretary's personal attendance is important to Nevadans and seems reasonable given the magnitude of the DOE's proposal and the intense opposition in our state. Failure to honor the spirit of the NWPA further undermines the credibility of the DOE and its biased characterization of the proposed repository.

It is important to remember that the purpose of this hearing was to hear public comment on a series of documents consisting of tens of thousands of written pages that DOE has been working on for nearly two decades. This is a daunting challenge for even the most sophisticated citizen and I hope that you will ensure that all citizens have appropriate time to participate in the public review. The citizens of Nevada have not had the time or opportunity for a full and fair hearing of their concerns on this most important decision, which threatens the health, safety and quality of life of all Nevadans.

Response

The DOE acknowledges the concern regarding Nevadans' ability to participate in the public hearing process.

The DOE attempted to hold public hearings at locations and times that were most convenient for the general public. For the September 5, 2001, Las Vegas hearing, the meeting was moved to a DOE facility when the hotel originally scheduled for the meeting decided its facilities would not accommodate the expected attendance. Security officers were stationed at three points at the DOE facility to direct the public to parking spaces and the meeting room. These positions may have been mistaken for security checks by some attendees, however, none of the positions was established, nor did they function, as security checks.

The NWPA requires that the Secretary hold hearings in the vicinity of the Yucca Mountain site, and the DOE has complied with this requirement. These public hearings near the site were open to all members of the general public. The Federal Register and media announcements providing information on the hearings requested participation by all those choosing to attend. Once present, all those wishing an opportunity to speak were afforded such an opportunity.

The Las Vegas hearing was held as scheduled and included teleconferencing connections to three other cities within the state of Nevada: Carson City, Elko, and Reno, and connections to the Congressional studio for comments from the Nevada delegation. However, the events of September 11, 2001, warranted the postponement of the Amargosa Valley and Pahrump hearings. These hearings were rescheduled to and held on October 10 and October 12, 2001, respectively. In response to requests from the Nevada Congressional delegation and others, the DOE extended the comment period by 15 days to October 5, 2001, in a Federal Register notice (66 FR 47644) dated September 13, 2001. Subsequently, the period was extended further to October 19, 2001. On October 2, 2001, the DOE announced in the Federal Register (66 FR 50176) that the DOE's Yucca Mountain Science Centers in Las Vegas, Pahrump, and Beatty, Nevada would be staffed with DOE representatives and public stenographers to receive comments through the end of the established comment period. On October 3, 2001, the DOE announced "...additional opportunities, in various localities in Nevada and California, for the public to provide comments on the possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for development ...." These opportunities consisted of 29 hearing sessions that were held in each of Nevada's counties and California's Inyo County during the period extending from October 3 through October 12, 2001. Subsequently, a Federal Register notice (66 FR 51027) dated October 5, 2001, extended the comment period through midnight Friday, October 19, 2001. By the conclusion of the initial comment period, the DOE had held 57 public hearings on the consideration of Yucca Mountain across Nevada's 17 counties, and in Inyo County, California, providing 165 days of public comment and 345 hours of public hearing time.

In addition, on November 14, 2001, after the NRC finalized 10 CFR Part 63 for licensing and the DOE finalized 10 CFR Part 963, the Secretary announced a supplemental 30 day comment period, including nine supplemental hearings in Nevada to provide citizens an opportunity to comment on information that was not available at the conclusion of the initial comment period.

To provide even greater assurance that all comments that had been posted in a timely manner had been received, DOE continued to accept and has addressed in this CSD, comments received through the close of business on October 31, 2001. Any comments received after that date have been documented and have been addressed in a supplemental comment summary document.

Copies of all comment documents received from the public during the public comment period extending through October 31, 2001, were also compiled and made available for the Secretary's consideration.

During the course of the hearings and meetings associated with the Yucca Mountain site recommendation process, Secretary Abraham has been represented by members of his senior staff at many of the hearings. During the supplemental comment period, Secretary Abraham attended a hearing held in Las Vegas to personally hear the comments presented by the public. All of the he