Section 4 Part 1

Congress, through passage of the 1982 NWPA (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.), reiterated the federal government's responsibility to establish a mechanism for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive wastes, that are presently generated or stored at sites in 39 states, in a manner that would protect the public health and safety and the environment. The NWPA requires that the federal government take precautions to ensure that these materials do not adversely affect public health and safety and the environment for this and future generations.

The issue was raised by members of the public that Nevada has no nuclear power plants and, therefore, should not be chosen as a repository site.

Although Nevada has no nuclear power plants, its residents benefit in many ways from the stability of the western states electrical grid that is fed, in part, by nuclear power plants in other western states and from the benefits of both the military and civilian nuclear power programs which accrue to all states of the nation. The DOE acknowledges that Nevada has played a major role in nuclear related activities. All of the individual states within the United States of America are repeatedly called upon to make significant contributions for the betterment of the whole. Congress, with the passage of the NWPA, as amended in 1987, directed the DOE to focus its activities related to determining the suitability of a site for a nuclear waste repository on the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada. The DOE has followed that mandate.

An issue was raised by members of the public that the nuclear power industry unfairly influenced the decision to further study Yucca Mountain as a preferred repository site.

The decision to focus activities related to establishing a site for a national nuclear waste repository on the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada was made by Congress in 1987 through the passage of amendments to the NWPA. The decision to proceed in this manner was made by a majority of the elected representatives from all states in the nation and approved by the President.

An issue has been raised by members of the public that, because the expected amount of high-level radioactive waste will exceed 70,000 MTHM, a repository such as the one at Yucca Mountain will not solve the waste problem.

As of December 1999, the United States had generated approximately 40,000 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants. In addition, there is also a significant amount of high-level nuclear wastes resulting from nuclear weapons production. The total inventory of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste could eventually exceed 100,000 MTHM, depending on the number of reactors that receive operating life extensions. Although the Yucca Mountain repository would have the capacity to store all the nation's nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel, the NWPA limits the initial nuclear waste repository to a capacity of 70,000 MTHM of solidified high-level radioactive waste until such time as a second repository is in operation. Any change to this limitation would necessitate further Congressional action

An issue has been raised by members of the public that science cannot forecast results beyond the 10,000-year postclosure period that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards require and that some of the high-level radioactive waste will still exist after that period.

The National Academy of Sciences determined that the analytical tools are available to assess the maximum risk of a repository with reasonable assurance. The EPA established a regulatory period of 10,000 years in their standards. The EPA assessed the nature of dose projections that go beyond 10,000 years and determined that they would give a more complete description of repository behavior than just an assessment for 10,000 years after repository closure but are not appropriate as regulatory standards. Further information on the nature of dose projections after 10,000 years can be found in the supplemental information issued with the final rule at 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074).

An issue has been raised by members of the public that removing the risks associated with current storage of high-level waste at the points of generation transfers that risk to Nye County, Nevada.

As explained in the S&ER Rev. 1, the SSE, and the FEIS, placing the high-level radioactive waste in such a repository, would effectively keep nuclear waste isolated from the environment in geologic formations, thus providing a safe location for the waste to decay into a stable form. The risk to the people of Nye County is small and the doses would likely be below the NRC radiation protection standards for licensing, as reported in Section 4.4 and Chapter 5 (postclosure and preclosure safety results) of the S&ER Rev. 1.

An issue has been raised by members of the public that future generations will find the disposal in a repository to be an unsound solution to disposition of nuclear waste.

The possibility that changing conditions, both scientific and societal, could affect long-term decisions regarding continued use of a repository was recognized during development of repository regulations and during initial repository design. Section 122 of the NWPA (42 U.S.C. 10142) requires retrievability at a geologic repository. NRC licensing regulations (10 CFR Part 63 [66 FR 55732]) require that a repository design preserve the option of retrieval on a reasonable schedule for as long as 50 years after the start of waste emplacement or some other period approved by the NRC. The design described in the S&ER Rev. 1 for the Yucca Mountain repository would allow the flexibility to preserve options for modifying emplacement and retrieving waste prior to closure. This design would maintain the ability to retrieve emplaced materials for up to 300 years following completion of repository operations, in the event of a decision to retrieve the waste either to protect the public health and safety or the environment, or to recover resources from spent nuclear fuel. During this period, a repository would remain accessible for continued testing and monitoring while providing flexibility to future generations, who could conduct repository performance confirmation and ultimately determine the timing and methods of repository closure.

Members of the public have indicated that it is safer to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at one site than to leave it stored at different sites scattered about the country.

At-reactor spent nuclear fuel storage systems, such as spent fuel pools, have been operated for decades without undue risk to the general public or nuclear plant personnel. Fuel pools, by design, include active systems. However, such systems require continuous technical and management oversight of a substantial amount of process equipment (such as water-cooling, water-treatment, and leak-detection systems). Moreover, according to utility reports, the pools at many reactor sites already have or soon will run out of storage space. In order to avoid potential premature shutdowns and a significant loss of electrical generating capability, a number of utilities have decided to add dry storage systems to provide additional onsite storage. While dry storage systems do not require active components to keep the spent fuel cool, such systems must be routinely monitored to ensure compliance with regulatory standards. In addition, 24-hour security must be provided to safeguard the stored materials.

Members of the public have stated that the impacts of operating the repository are small and the DOE should proceed with repository development.

Based on the extensive evaluations and scientific research to date, the DOE believes that a repository sited at Yucca Mountain would have little impact, if any, on the health and safety of the public and the environment.

Members of the public have stated that continued construction of onsite storage facilities at points of generation, which will be required if no centralized repository is developed, is expensive and leads to more health and safety concerns than a centralized disposal solution.

Members of the public noted that the continued or expanded use of nuclear power depends on the development of a repository for spent nuclear fuel.

At present, commercial nuclear power plants produce approximately 20 percent of the total electric power generated nationwide. The role nuclear power plants would play in the future of the nation depends on the re-licensing and future power generation decisions made by each commercial utility. The DOE has no authority over the licensing and operation of commercial nuclear power plants.

Members of the public have indicated that advances in technology will offer new solutions for handling or reusing spent nuclear fuel, and the design of the repository should facilitate removal of any spent fuel.

Operation and closure of a repository at Yucca Mountain would include a lengthy program of monitoring, testing, and performance confirmation. Retrievability of spent nuclear fuel is a requirement of the NWPA. Retrievability is justified for reasons of public health and safety, environmental concerns, and recovery of the economically valuable contents of spent nuclear fuel. Retrievability would give future decision-makers the ability to take advantage of technological advances, implement corrective actions, if required, and make societal choices on closing the repository or retrieving the wastes. The operational plan for a repository at Yucca Mountain would provide for a design and management approach that isolates wastes from the public in the future while allowing flexibility to preserve options for modifying emplacement or retrieving the material.

Members of the public favor the use of the Yucca Mountain site because of its proximity to the Nevada Test Site.

The NWPA specified a process for selecting sites for technical study as potential geologic repository locations. In accordance with this process, the DOE identified nine candidate sites, the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine sites for further consideration, and the DOE issued environmental assessments for the five sites. The DOE recommended three of the five sites, of which Yucca Mountain was one, for possible study as repository site candidates.

Members of the public agree with selection of Yucca Mountain for further study because of the low population density in the site area.

The population immediately surrounding the repository site is sparse. Section 1.3.2.1 of the S&ER Rev. 1 discusses population density in the vicinity of the proposed site. There are no permanent residents within 22 kilometers (14 miles), and Nye County averages only 0.6 persons per square kilometer (1.5 persons per square mile). Of the total population of 29,730 in Nye County, 68 percent live in Pahrump, 70 to 80 kilometers (43 to 50 miles) southeast of Yucca Mountain. Most of the other counties surrounding Yucca Mountain, including Lincoln and Esmerelda counties in Nevada and Inyo County in California, also have low population densities. The nearest large population resides in Clark County, approximately 130 kilometers (80 miles) southeast of Yucca Mountain.

Members of the public agree with selection of Yucca Mountain for further study because the site is already owned by the federal government.

As described in the S&ER Rev. 1 and the FEIS, the site is owned and controlled by the federal government.

Members of the public favor development of a monitored retrievable storage facility at Yucca Mountain in conjunction with the repository.

In NWPA, Sections 141 through 149, Congress provided a mechanism for the possible development of monitored retrievable storage facilities as an option for long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. However, this authority to develop such facilities is limited by NWPA Section 141(g), which prohibits the development of such facilities in any state in which there is located any site approved for site characterization for a repository. Therefore, at the present time, the DOE is not permitted to develop a monitored retrievable storage facility at the Yucca Mountain site.

An issue raised by members of the public is the readability and understandability of the site-recommendation-related documents. The technical nature of the project analyses and design and the detail presented in these documents have made them hard to understand by some of the readers.

The DOE recognizes that the detailed information regarding the design and operation of a repository could be confusing and hard to understand by some readers. The DOE has taken numerous actions to reduce the confusion to the extent possible and improve readability and understandability of all of the site-recommendation-related documents. For example, these documents include a number of explanatory text boxes, summary tables, illustrations with extensive detail, and comparative information that stresses and highlights the issues of potential importance to the reader. In addition, the documents each include a comprehensive glossary of technical terms. By nature, these documents include extensive technical information and the goal has been to make them understandable to the public.

Because of the size and complexity of the documents distributed for public review, an issue was raised by members of the public that the time allotted for review and comment was not adequate.

The DOE believes that it has provided adequate time for the review of all of the site-recommendation-related documents. To facilitate public review and comment on the large amount of information the DOE has compiled over the years regarding the Yucca Mountain site, in May 2001 the DOE issued the S&ER. The information and data compiled in this report address the subjects described in Section 114(a)(1)(A) to (C) of the NWPA, as amended. In addition, on August 21, 2001, the DOE issued a Federal Register notice that announced the release of the PSSE for public review and comment. The DEIS and the SDEIS had also been previously made available to the public. By providing this information to the public in advance of public hearings, the DOE sought to enhance the ability of the public to review and comment on the data the DOE has compiled to date.

An issue was raised by members of the public that the DOE has not adequately advertised the various public hearings associated with the site recommendation process.

All reasonable efforts were made to ensure that hearings were adequately advertised and members of the public were aware of the intent of the hearings and the role that they could play in those hearings. In addition to the Federal Register notices, before each hearing the DOE placed advertisements in local newspapers, including Spanish-language newspapers, and distributed text for public service announcements and press releases to local and national stakeholders and media outlets to publicize information that was accessible to the general public and to minority and low-income communities. Additional mailings were sent to stakeholders announcing any changes, and additions to the list of public hearings were also made available on the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project website (www.ymp.gov).

An issue has been raised by members of the public regarding the facilities made available for the site-recommendation-related public hearings. Specific concerns were raised that the use of the DOE facilities was inappropriate, time for comments was limited to five minutes per commenter, and the format of the meetings (podium and microphone) was intimidating.

The DOE attempted to obtain the best and most appropriate facilities available in the locations where public hearings were to be held. The DOE selected facilities for these hearings after consultation with county representatives, members of Congress, DOE field offices, and other stakeholders. The DOE attempted to hold public hearings at locations and times that were most convenient for the general public. In one case, the meeting was moved to a DOE facility when the hotel originally scheduled for the meeting decided its facilities would not accommodate the expected attendance. Facilities and meeting room accommodations were planned to provide ample seating.

An issue was raised by members of the public that the notices describing the purpose of the site-recommendation-related public hearings are not clear or are misleading and lack relevant information.

The DOE took all reasonable actions to clarify the purpose of the hearings and made available to the public the documents that contain information relevant to the hearings. The DOE made multiple mailings regarding the intent to hold public hearings and the purpose thereof to all individuals and/or entities on the project mailing lists. These initial mailings were supplemented when the schedule or other details regarding the meetings were changed. These mailings typically specified the intent of the meetings and how the public could participate. Background materials and meeting notices were also made available on the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project website (www.ymp.gov). In addition, before each hearing, the DOE placed advertisements announcing the hearing and its intent in local newspapers and distributed text for public service announcements and press releases to local and national stakeholders and media outlets to publicize information that was accessible to the general public.

An issue has been raised by members of the public related to the effect of decisions made regarding reprocessing on the need for the facility. Some favored reprocessing spent fuel; others opposed reprocessing.

Because of the national policy against it, reprocessing is not currently an option for dealing with spent nuclear fuel. However, even if the political and economic environments were to change in favor of reprocessing, the need for a repository would still exist. Reprocessing would reduce the total inventory of material over time, but high-level radioactive waste would still remain and require permanent disposal.

Members of the public have claimed that as a result of the Congressional direction to the DOE to only consider a single repository site at Yucca Mountain, the decision on Yucca Mountain has already been made and the environmental impact statement was only done to justify that decision.

Congress made the decision to focus site characterization activities on Yucca Mountain through the amendment of the NWPA, in 1987. The NWPA, as originally enacted in 1982, began a process for selecting sites for technical study as potential geologic repository locations. In accordance with this process, the DOE identified nine candidate sites; the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine sites for further consideration, and the DOE issued environmental assessments for the five sites. Of these five sites, the DOE recommended three, of which Yucca Mountain was one, for possible study as repository site candidates. In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA, directing the Secretary of Energy to perform site characterization activities at the Yucca Mountain site and, if the site is found suitable, make a recommendation to the President on whether to approve the site for development of a repository. Congress' decision to further investigate geologic disposal only at Yucca Mountain reflects the results of many years of scientific, engineering, and technical studies and activities at Yucca Mountain. The Secretary has indicated any recommendation would be based on sound science.

An issue has been raised by members of the public indicating that the citizens of Nevada should have the final decision on siting a repository in the State of Nevada and the only reason the DOE is studying Yucca Mountain is because Nevada is politically weak.

The disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is a concern for the country as a whole, as well as the State of Nevada. Figure 1 of the S&ER Rev. 1 shows the sites in 39 states where radioactive waste is generated or stored. Developing a geologic repository for disposing of the materials and a system for transporting the materials to a repository has become the focus of a national effort, and the decisions regarding disposition of high-level radioactive waste are being made on a national basis. Nevada citizens have input into that process through their democratically elected representatives in Congress and the State of Nevada legislature and governor's office. In accordance with Section 116(c) of the NWPA, the state of Nevada has received financial assistance for purposes of determining any potential economic, social, public health and safety, and environmental impacts of a repository at Yucca Mountain.

Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 of the S&ER Rev. 1 describe the permits, licenses, and approvals needed for the design, construction, operation and closure of the repository. Obtaining applicable permits, licenses, and approvals would be a prerequisite to the performance of any activity associated with the project including the transport of spent nuclear fuel and/or high-level radioactive waste to and receipt at the site. If the site is eventually approved, the NRC would be responsible for reviewing related activities and issuing the necessary licenses and permits when the DOE demonstrates its ability to perform these activities in accordance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements. No activities would take place before receipt of required licenses and permits.

An issue has been raised by members of the public that the DOE is obligated to accept spent nuclear fuel from the nation's nuclear power plants, and the DOE should maintain its schedule to allow better planning for disposal by those power plants.

Provided the current schedule is maintained, including the necessary approvals, permitting, and licensing, emplacement of waste at the Yucca Mountain site could begin in 2010. The DOE is responsible for the ultimate disposition of spent nuclear fuel from commercial utilities and recognizes the need to make its recommendation expeditiously.

An issue has been raised by members of the public expressing the view that nuclear power production is vital to the nation and that a viable waste management program needs to be implemented.

The DOE recognizes the contribution nuclear generated electricity has made to the nation and the importance of arriving at a solution for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

An issue has been raised by members of the public regarding the completeness and accuracy of the DOE's public information and the DOE's honesty.

Based on the DOE policy of openness, the rigor of its scientific studies, and the checks and balances described below, the DOE is confident in the accuracy and completeness of its impact descriptions presented in the various public documents.

An issue has been raised by members of the public that recognized and complimented the DOE's commitment to worker safety.

Radiological and industrial safety are high priorities at DOE facilities. The DOE's goal is to promote the safety of workers, as well as the safety of the public and the protection of the environment.

The SSE has been corrected to give the correct location for Devils Hole relative to the Yucca Mountain site.

The NRC is the federal agency authorized to regulate the nuclear power industry. As such, the DOE has no authority regarding the regulation of the nuclear industry, including their security systems.

The spent fuel coming back to the United States from overseas was part of the Atoms for Peace Program started by President Eisenhower with the intent that the fuel be returned to the U.S. There have been a number of these Foreign Research Reactor Fuel shipments safely made already from both Europe and the Far East. There is no intent for the United States to accept any other type of foreign reactor spent nuclear fuel.

4.2.1 NRC Licensing-Related Requirements

4.2.1 (128)

Summary Comment

Issues have been raised by members of the public about the effectiveness of the active and passive institutional controls that would be implemented at a Yucca Mountain repository. The issues include the bases for the controls; the feasibility of implementing effective controls; and the ability of future generations to understand and interpret passive controls that would be implemented following closure of the repository. Related issues addressed demonstration of the effectiveness and longevity of institutional controls relative to the long-lived nature of the waste in the repository; the level of detail about institutional control measures the DOE would implement; and the need for extended equipment maintenance periods.

Issue

Issues were raised by members of the public relative to the duration of institutional controls in view of the long life of the waste, adequacy of postclosure monitoring programs, the point of commencement of passive institutional controls, and institutional fallibility. Issues were also raised addressing the need to maintain the ventilation and similar systems for extended periods of time.

Response

The details of institutional controls and postclosure monitoring would be developed by the DOE in the application for any license amendment for closure of a repository, consistent with NRC's licensing-related regulations at 10 CFR 63.51. The DOE would plan to conduct postclosure monitoring, and would provide a description of the program to the NRC prior to permanent closure consistent with 10 CFR 63.51 (66 FR 55801). Monitoring, which may include hydrologic monitoring, would be one basis for the NRC authorization to allow permanent closure.

Two types of institutional controls would be implemented at the repository: passive and active. Active institutional controls (i.e., monitored and enforced limitations on site access; inspection and maintenance of waste packages, facilities, equipment, etc.) would be used through closure. Passive institutional controls (i.e., markers, engineered barriers, etc., that are not monitored or maintained) would be put in place during closure and used to minimize inadvertent exposure of members of the public to radionuclides in the future.

After closure, the DOE would have the responsibility of maintaining institutional control, as required by Section 801(c) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law No. 102-486 106 Stat. 2776). The methods, extent, and length of this requirement would be defined as part of the licensing process and the DOE would maintain appropriate institutional control. Section 4.1.5 of the S&ER Rev. 1 discusses repository closure activities, including postclosure monitoring and the use of institutional controls such as land records and warning systems to inform future generations of the location and hazards of the closed repository. Institutional controls (i.e., markers, records etc.,) would be put in place during closure for the information of future consistent with NRC licensing regulations at 10 CFR 63.51 (66 FR 55801).

Section 801(a)(B) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776) directed the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for the protection of public health and safety.

The National Academy of Sciences concluded that it is not reasonable to assume that a system for postclosure oversight of a repository, based on active institutional control, could be developed that would prevent an unreasonable risk of breaching the repository's engineered barriers. The National Academy of Sciences based this conclusion on the absence of any scientific basis for making long-term projections of the social, institutional, or technological status of future societies. It also concluded that there is no technical basis for making forecasts about the long-term reliability of passive institutional controls, such as markers, monuments, and records. However, the National Academy of Sciences also stated that while there is no scientific basis for judging whether active institutional control could prevent an unreasonable risk of human intrusion, a collection of prescriptive requirements including active institutional control, record-keeping, and passive barriers and markers would help reduce the risk of human intrusion at least in the near term [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588. Page 11.].

In the TSPA-SR and the PSSE, the DOE projected that a stylized human intrusion scenario, based on proposed regulations of the NRC, would expose the RMEI to less than 0.01 millirem per year. At that time, the NRC performance objective for human intrusion was 25 millirem per year, and it prescribed a scenario in which human intrusion would occur at 100 years after repository closure (64 FR 8676). However, in their final licensing regulations (10 CFR 63.321), the NRC requires the DOE to first determine when the waste packages would degrade sufficiently that a human intrusion could occur without recognition by the driller. If human intrusion, without recognition by the driller, could not occur at or before the 10,000 year compliance period, then the analysis of the human intrusion scenario must be presented in the Yucca Mountain environmental impact statement and the dose limits for the human intrusion standards would not apply.

Based on an analysis in Appendix A of the SSPA Volume 1, the DOE has determined that the earliest time after disposal that the waste packages would degrade sufficiently, that a human intrusion could occur without recognition by the drillers, is 30,000 years. Before that time, drillers would recognize that they had drilled into waste packages because the compressive strength and ductility of the metals from which they and the drip shields are fabricated differ significantly from the rock that would surround them. Drillers would notice these differences. For example, the drilling assembly would buckle and bend when the bit attempts to penetrate the titanium drip shield and waste package (drill bits that are designed for rock do not easily penetrate metal, particularly titanium). The drillers should, therefore, recognize that they have attempted to drill into some material other than rock for at least as long as the drip shield or packages are intact, which is approximately 30,000 years. Although the supplemental TSPA model projects that a few waste packages may fail prematurely, these failures are caused by localized corrosion that would not weaken the overall structural integrity of the waste packages. Consequently, the waste packages would resist drilling even after they have failed.

As noted in Section 1.3 of the SSE, "The DOE has developed a flexible design for a Yucca Mountain disposal system that will give future generations the choice of either closing and sealing the underground facility as early as allowable under applicable regulations or keeping it open and monitoring it for a longer time period." This time period could be as long as 325 years following initial emplacement.

Maintenance of engineered systems, such as ventilation fans and repository shafts would be used until such time as the repository is permanently closed consistent with the licensing-related regulations of 10 CFR Part 63. 10 CFR 63.2 (66 FR 55732) defined permanent closure as meaning the "final backfilling of the underground facility, if appropriate, and the sealing of shafts, ramps and boreholes." Maintenance activities during the preclosure period would maintain the operability and reliability of engineered systems, and would be conducted in accord with any relevant provisions of a NRC license.

Issue

Issues were raised by members of the public concerning the ability to communicate information about repository hazards to future civilizations.

Response

Consistent with recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, the implementing regulations applicable to the Yucca Mountain site at 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732) do not require assessment of the effectiveness of postclosure institutional controls. However, 10 CFR Part 63 does define a number of considerations relative to institutional controls that the DOE must address satisfactorily before a license amendment authorizing permanent closure of the repository would be approved.

Section 4.1.5 of the S&ER Rev. 1 discusses repository closure activities, including the use of institutional controls such as land records and warning systems to inform future generations of the location and hazards of the closed repository. Institutional controls (i.e., markers, records etc.,) would be put in place during repository closure activities for the information of future generations consistent with the NRC licensing regulations at 10 CFR 63.51 (66 FR 55801).

The National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588.] concluded that there is no technical basis for making forecasts about the long-term reliability or effectiveness of passive institutional controls, such as markers, monuments, and records. Monuments would be designed, fabricated, and placed to be as permanent as practicable. The NRC licensing criteria for a repository at Yucca Mountain (10 CFR Part 63) [66 FR 55732]) adopt the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences with regard to human intrusion, including the position that it is not credible to attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of controls (see 10 CFR 63.102(k) (66 FR 55804). Consistent with the NRC position, postclosure evaluations of repository system performance do not take credit for contributions to waste isolation that may result from the application of institutional controls, including the ability to communicate to future civilizations.

4.2.1 (129)

Summary Comment

Issues were raised by members of the public about the implementation and timing of the performance confirmation concept, including a need to complete performance confirmation activities prior to site recommendation, and future actions that may be taken should performance confirmation results be unfavorable. Issues were raised with respect to the adequacy of existing hydrologic data, the need for groundwater monitoring programs and radioactive waste retrieval. An issue was also noted that closure of a repository at any time in the future would make monitoring more difficult, and that the only way to ensure long term repository performance would be to keep it open.

Issue

The level of reasonable expectation that would exist as a result of performance confirmation was raised as an issue by the public. In addition, the issue of contingency plan availability was questioned should there be a determination that the repository could not perform as desired after closure. Issues were raised by members of the public that major deficiencies remain, that additional research is required, and that the performance of engineered systems and waste packages may not be sufficient to contain the waste.

Response

The performance confirmation program required by the NRC would be used to evaluate the adequacy of information used in the licensing process, including information relevant to both natural and engineered barriers, and to evaluate actual subsurface conditions encountered during construction and waste emplacement operations.

The phased licensing process described in 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732) requires determinations by the NRC that there is a reasonable expectation that a repository at Yucca Mountain would perform as required. These phases would include construction, receipt of radioactive material, and permanent closure of the repository. If Yucca Mountain is recommended and approved for development of a repository, the DOE would submit a license application to the NRC for approval before proceeding to the next phase. As part of the license application, the DOE would include a performance confirmation program consistent with NRC licensing regulations in 10 CFR 63.

Performance confirmation as defined by the NRC at 10 CFR 63.2 (66 FR 55794) is "the program of tests, experiments, and analyses that is conducted to evaluate the adequacy of the information used to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives of subpart E of this part." The DOE's plans already address programs for monitoring, testing, and performance confirmation as required by 10 CFR 63, Subpart F (66 FR 55808). The performance confirmation program began during site characterization and would continue through closure of the repository. The DOE's plans would allow extended periods of monitoring before permanent closure. Section 4.6 of the S&ER Rev. 1 provides details on the performance confirmation and testing programs.

Performance confirmation results would be a factor in the evaluation by the NRC whether there is a reasonable expectation that the disposal system would perform as projected, thereby supporting a determination, for example, that a repository could be safely closed

The NRC regulations and EPA standards applicable to licensing a repository at Yucca Mountain (10 CFR 63.101(a)(2) [66 FR 55804] and 40 CFR Part 197 [66 FR 32133], respectively) address the fact that there would be uncertainties in assessing performance of a repository and that absolute proof is not achievable. Instead, the NRC must determine that there is a reasonable expectation that the repository would operate and function as projected. The DOE would demonstrate, in a license application, compliance with the regulations while at the same time accounting for the uncertainties. The NRC, based upon its review of a license application and related materials, would then determine if there is a reasonable expectation that the postclosure radiation protection requirements would be met. Performance confirmation testing would provide added confidence so that the NRC would have a level of reasonable expectation that would allow the NRC to approve a DOE license amendment to close the repository.

Issue

An issue was raised that performance confirmation is simply an extension of the site characterization process since the DOE does not presently have adequate information to determine site suitability with reasonable assurance.

Response

The S&ER Rev. 1 presents extensive scientific information. The Yucca Mountain SSE provides an evaluation of the site's performance against the site suitability guidelines in 10 CFR Part 963. These reports are, in turn, supported by a comprehensive set of scientific and technical documents, as well as by detailed performance analyses. Thus, the Secretary has access to an extensive data and analysis library to form the basis for any recommendation.

While certain performance confirmation activities started during site characterization, continuing performance confirmation activities would serve to evaluate the adequacy of the information used to support any construction authorization application, any license to receive and possess waste, and any request for an amendment to close the repository. The performance confirmation program would also be used to evaluate repository operating conditions on an ongoing basis.

As discussed in Section 4.6 of the S&ER Rev 1, performance confirmation would be conducted during all phases of the project, including site characterization, repository construction, and operation prior to closure. Key geologic, hydrologic, geomechanical, and other physical processes or factors (and related parameters) would be monitored and tested throughout repository construction and operation to detect any significant changes from baseline conditions. The DOE would use this data to confirm that subsurface conditions are consistent with the assumptions used in performance analyses, and that barrier systems and components operate as expected. Amendment of any license, by the NRC, to authorize repository closure would be supported by the results of the performance confirmation program and its contribution to a finding that there is reasonable expectation of compliance with the licensing requirements of 10 CFR Part 63.

Issue

Issues were raised by members of the public about the plans for monitoring of contributing aquifers and if the monitoring program would continue through operation and into the postclosure period. A recommendation was also made that hydrologic monitoring programs should include participation by local governments.

Response

Performance confirmation, which may include aquifer-monitoring programs, began during site characterization and would continue throughout repository operation and until permanent closure.

The DOE is currently participating in a cooperative agreement with Nye County to install a series of groundwater monitoring wells in the Amargosa Desert and the southern portion of the Nevada Test Site. The purpose of this Early Warning Drilling Program is to characterize and monitor the saturated zone along potential transport pathways from Yucca Mountain. Continuing this program as part of the performance confirmation program would be evaluated by the DOE in developing a performance confirmation program plan that would be submitted to the NRC for approval as part of any license application.

The purpose of the performance confirmation program, including aquifer monitoring, would be to determine, in part, if the repository was performing as predicted. Monitoring and related performance confirmation programs are subject to NRC review and approval. In addition, the DOE would plan to conduct postclosure monitoring, and would provide a description of the program to the NRC prior to permanent closure consistent with 10 CFR 63.51 (66 FR 55801). Monitoring, which may include hydrologic monitoring, would be a basis for the NRC authorization for permanent closure. The DOE would develop this monitoring program based on data and analyses derived, for example, from the TSPA and the Early Warning Drilling Program.

Issue

Issues were raised by members of the public that the option to retrieve or recover radioactive waste for its resource value as well as for radiological safety purposes must be maintained. In addition, issues were raised about the feasibility of maintaining the capability to retrieve radioactive waste for the required period and the level of detail necessary to have reasonable assurance that radioactive waste can be retrieved. An issue was also raised that, contrary to the provisions of the NWPA, retrieval of emplaced wastes for their economic or energy value should not be allowed.

Response

Maintenance of the capability to retrieve waste is an inherent part of the repository design as required by the NWPA.

Consistent with Section 122 of the NWPA, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10142), the DOE would maintain the ability to retrieve emplaced spent nuclear fuel "for an appropriate period of operation ... for any reason pertaining to the public health and safety, or the environment, or for the purpose of permitting the recovery of the economically valuable contents of such spent fuel." Consistent with NRC licensing regulations at 10 CFR 63.111(e) (66 FR 55806) the repository design would allow any or all of the radioactive waste could be retrieved on a reasonable schedule starting at any time up to 50 years after the start of waste emplacement, unless a different time is approved or specified by the NRC. As part of any licensing process for a repository at Yucca Mountain, the NRC would review and approve the DOE plans and design concepts for the retrieval of radioactive waste, and would determine if there is reasonable assurance that retrieval could be accomplished if required. Therefore, the operational plan for a repository at Yucca Mountain would provide a design and management approach that would isolate wastes from the public in the future while allowing flexibility to preserve options for modifying emplacement and retrieving the waste.

A number of the performance and design confirmation parameters that would be addressed under the NRC licensing regulations for performance confirmation at Subpart F of 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55808) would generate data that would be directly applicable to retrieval, thus providing additional confidence that retrieval could be accomplished if required.

There are currently no plans for the retrieval of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste for economic purposes. However, as noted above, repository design would accommodate recovery for economic purposes. In addition, the DOE recognizes that the development of new technologies for radioactive waste management could occur in the future. In fact, at the direction of Congress, the DOE is studying accelerator transmutation of radioactive waste. The transmutation process involves state-of-the-art principles, some of which are not yet proven. Even if transmutation became a feasible technology, a repository would remain an essential element of the nuclear fuel cycle because significant quantities of highly radioactive, long-lived materials would remain.

Section 2.3.4 of the S&ER Rev. 1 discusses, in detail, the requirements and design considerations appropriate to retrieval. Retrieval under both normal and off-normal conditions is addressed. In addition, Section 3.5.3 of the S&ER Rev. 1 discusses design of the waste package in terms of the need to accommodate retrieval for a period of up to 300 years after completion of waste emplacement.

Issue

Issues were raised by the public concerning the lack of safeguards for and the virtually permanent proliferation threat of nuclear weapons materials in used nuclear fuel in a geologic repository were raised. It was stated that used nuclear fuel could be easily retrieved from the repository after a few hundred years decay of intensely radioactive fission products and that plutonium could be recovered with very simple chemical processes, and that this nuclear proliferation threat should have been included in the environmental review process.

Response

This concern is based on an incorrect view of the level of effort that would be required to retrieve packaged spent nuclear fuel from the repository and convert to bomb-grade material.

In the postclosure period, deep geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would provide optimal security by emplacing the material in a geologic formation that would provide protection from inadvertent and advertent human intrusion, including potential terrorist activities. The use of robust metal waste packages to contain the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste entombed 300 meters (100 feet) below the surface would offer significant impediments to any attempt to retrieve or otherwise disturb the emplaced materials.

In the postclosure period, a repository at Yucca Mountain would offer certain unique features from a safeguards perspective: a remote location, restricted access afforded by federal land ownership and proximity to the Nevada Test Site, restricted airspace above the site, and access to a highly effective rapid-response security force.

4.2.2 DOE Siting Guidelines

4.2.2 (1)

Summary Comment

Members of the public raised issues that, based on the original DOE siting guidelines, Yucca Mountain should be eliminated as a site for a nuclear waste repository. It was stated that, rather than disqualifying the site based on existing criteria in 10 CFR Part 960, Congress and the DOE have changed and weakened the site suitability criteria, and the new criteria would not be sufficient to protect public health and safety. With respect to the revised criteria, it was questioned why there are no specific disqualifiers. Some members of the public stated their belief that the DOE changed the rules to facilitate siting of a repository at Yucca Mountain; that the Yucca Mountain site cannot meet the siting guidelines specified in 10 CFR Part 960; and that 10 CFR Part 960 should have been used as the basis for the evaluation.

Issue

An issue was raised by the public that the DOE's siting guidelines at 10 CFR Part 960 were weakened in the final guidelines at 10 CFR Part 963 (66 FR 57298). Issues were raised that 10 CFR Part 963 was developed to facilitate the selection of Yucca Mountain, that the site would be disqualified if 10 CFR Part 960 were applied, and that evaluations of potential Yucca Mountain site suitability should have been conducted using 10 CFR Part 960, rather than 10 CFR Part 963.

Response

The DOE did not amend Part 960 and adopt Part 963 to avoid disqualification of the Yucca Mountain site. Rather, the purpose of the Yucca Mountain-specific guidelines in 10 CFR Part 963 (66 FR 57298) is to implement the NWPA, as amended, given the Yucca Mountain-specific licensing-related standards of the EPA at 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) and the NRC at 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732), and to provide a technical basis to assess the suitability of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain.

Since 10 CFR Part 963 is consistent with the site-specific NRC licensing regulations and EPA standards at 10 CFR Part 63 and 40 CFR Part 197, respectively, evaluation against 10 CFR Part 960 would no longer be consistent with, and in some cases, may even conflict with, the regulatory framework that would be used to consider any license application for a Yucca Mountain Repository.

Issue

Issues were raised by members of the public concerning the ability of the Yucca Mountain site to meet the 10 CFR Part 960 guidelines for groundwater travel time and carbon releases, and some commenters stated that the site should be disqualified on those grounds.

Response

In its deliberations on the "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" a National Research Council committee suggested to the EPA that expected releases of carbon-14 to the world population, even if conservatively calculated, would be a "negligible incremental risk" [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588. Page 313.]. The EPA evaluated this advice when preparing the final 40 CFR Part 197 and did not include a separate standard for carbon-14 emissions.

An issue was raised that groundwater travel time criterion in the 1985 DOE Generic Siting Guidelines (10 CFR Part 960) is a reason to disqualify the Yucca Mountain site. As noted above, that regulation does not apply to Yucca Mountain, having been replaced by the Site Suitability Guidelines at 10 CFR Part 963 (66 FR 57298). The guidelines at 10 CFR 963 are specific to Yucca Mountain and, consistent with final EPA standards (40 CFR Part 197) and NRC (10 CFR Part 63) licensing regulations, do not include a groundwater travel time requirement. The National Research Council [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588.] observed that the regulation requiring a preemplacement groundwater travel time calculation was based on an assumption that the repository would be in the saturated zone, not the unsaturated zone, which is the current design. The committee observed that this requirement might be "an explicit example of suboptimization, it could be that in a specific geologic setting the requirement to keep groundwater travel times to the accessible environment above 1,000 years, as required by 10 CFR Part 60, might have next to no effect on future individual risks. However, such a requirement could force the repository design team to alter the specific location of the emplaced waste to a location that, although it could meet the travel-time requirement, would be less optimal." The National Research Council recognized that many factors control the safety of a system, and concluded that groundwater travel times at Yucca Mountain might be less relevant than other factors in assuring the overall system safety.

4.2.2 (933)

Summary Comment

An issue was raised by the public that there appeared to be some confusing language regarding the probabilities associated with volcanic events on page xxvii of the Executive Summary. In the second paragraph under disruptive events, the phrase,"--- one chance in 10,000 per year over 10,000 years (per proposed 10 CFR 963.16(b)(4)" this could lead the reader to believe that the probability that such event occurs is unity or certain to occur. On the other hand, in paragraph 963.16(b) 4), the criteria is stated as follows: "Consider only events that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years."

Response

10 CFR 963.16(b)(4) states: "Consider only events that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years." The statement on page xxvii of the PSSE Executive Summary that the threshold is "... one chance in 10,000 per year over 10,000 years..." is confusing. Appropriate corrections have been made in the SSE and in the S&ER Rev. 1.

4.2.3 Federal Environmental Regulatory Requirements

4.2.3 (4)

Summary Comment

Issues have been raised about future groundwater quality and the future supply of groundwater if a repository is built. Issues include the "permissible pollution" of groundwater sources and reduction of available groundwater supplies due to radionuclide contamination.

Issue

The issue of whether the federal government has implemented a policy of permissible pollution upgradient from the communities of Amargosa Valley and Pahrump has been raised.

Response

Based on the results of analyses presented in Chapter 4 of the S&ER Rev. 1, Chapter 3 of the SSE, and Chapter 5 of the FEIS on the long-term performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain, the DOE believes that a repository is likely to comply with applicable NRC licensing regulations and EPA standards, including those for protection of groundwater. The NRC licensing regulations can be found at 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR 55732) and applicable EPA standards can be found at 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074). The DOE recognizes that some radionuclides would, after long periods, enter the environment outside the repository. Nevertheless, modeling of the long-term performance of a repository indicates that the combination of natural and man-made barriers would keep such releases within the regulatory limits established by 10 CFR Part 63.

The DOE recognizes the importance of water to the inhabitation and development of land in southern Nevada. The FEIS points out that groundwater availability is a concern in many areas that a repository or associated transportation actions could affect. Chapter 3 of the FEIS (see Table 3-11) notes that current water appropriations for the Amargosa Desert are higher than some estimates of perennial yield for that area (though actual withdrawals are much less). The FEIS, Tables 3-39 and 3-40, identify hydrographic areas classified as "Designated Groundwater Basins." Designated groundwater basins are basins where permitted groundwater rights approach or exceed the estimated average annual recharge and the water resources are being depleted or require additional administration.

Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires the EPA (not the DOE) to set standards for the protection of public health and safety from releases of radioactive materials stored or disposed of at Yucca Mountain. For licensing, the NRC's groundwater and individual protection licensing standards, in 10 CFR Part 63, implement the corresponding EPA standards in 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074). The groundwater protection standards are compatible with relevant EPA drinking water standards for the entire United States, and the individual protection standard is 15 millirem per year. The dose standards are low compared to the average radiation exposure from natural sources of radiation of 300 millirem per year.

Issue

An issue was raised by the public that while other environmental resources have been protected by Congress (e.g., air, water), there is no similar protection for groundwater from radioactive waste, and that legislation is needed that will prevent the furthering of unsafe disposal practices until a cleaner source of power is found.

Response

The DOE cannot comment on the perceived need for additional environmental legislation. Such a comment should be directed to the commenter's representatives in Congress.

The NRC and the EPA have developed regulations and standards, respectively, for the long-term performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain. These regulations and standards specify a 10,000-year postclosure period. Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires the EPA (not DOE) to set standards for the protection of public health and safety from releases of radioactive materials stored or disposed of at Yucca Mountain. For licensing, the NRC groundwater protection standards follow the EPA's groundwater protection standards in 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074), which are compatible with relevant EPA drinking water standards for the entire United States. For licensing, the NRC individual protection standard is 15 millirem per year. This is low compared to the average radiation exposure from natural sources of radiation of 300 millirem per year.

4.2.3 (6)

Summary Comment

The use of a 10,000-year postclosure period for the repository long-term impact assessment has been raised as an issue. It has been stated that consideration of 10,000 years was inappropriate, given the potential for societal and technological changes; the hazards and potential need for human intervention, because some radioactive materials have half-lives much greater than 10,000 years; and the inability of science to forecast reliable repository performance over long periods of time. It is believed that constructing, operating and monitoring, and eventually closing a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would cause higher than acceptable levels of risk beyond the 10,000-year timeframe. In addition, concern has been expressed about the capability to design a system that would operate for 10,000 years and longer.
Being able to forecast and plan for what will occur 10,000 years in the future is considered by some to be absurd. Other concerns have been expressed regarding the human intrusion scenario being inadequate, unrealistic, or too constrained over the next 10,000 years. In addition, concerns have been expressed about the repository site conditions and consequences to future generations or societies. It has been suggested that future site conditions and population should be projected at least several thousand years into the future to assess the long-term socioeconomic and health impacts.

Issue

An issue has been raised by the public that the constructing, operating and monitoring, and eventually closing a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would cause higher than acceptable levels of risk after the 10,000-year timeframe. The issue raised contends that the DOE has focused on delaying releases from the repository so future generations inhabiting the area beyond the regulatory period must shoulder the burden of, and receive the effects of, the resulting contamination.

Response

Congress determined, through the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.), that the federal government has the responsibility to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste permanently to protect the public health and safety and the environment. The NWPA further states that the federal government must take precautions to ensure that these materials do not adversely affect this and future generations.

Congress, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law No. 102-486), directed the EPA to develop public health and safety standards for the protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in a repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Congress also directed the NRC to publish criteria for licensing the repository that would be consistent with the radiation protection standards established by the EPA. In part, these EPA standards (40 CFR Part 197 [66 FR 32074]) and NRC licensing regulations (10 CFR Part 63 [66 FR 55732]) prescribe radiation dose limits that the repository, based on a performance assessment, cannot exceed during a 10,000-year postclosure period.

Based on the repository design and performance assessment, the DOE believes that releases of radioactive materials for the 10,000-year postclosure period would likely be below the NRC's radiation protection standards for licensing. The DOE estimates that the mean peak dose to a hypothetical individual would be less than the dose received from natural background radiation and would not occur until about 480,000 years after closure. A performance assessment to evaluate the ability of the natural and engineered barriers system to limit releases of radioactive materials to the environment for thousands of years has been used by the DOE. As a result of this performance assessment, the DOE would not expect the repository to exceed the prescribed radiation dose limits during the 10,000-year postclosure period.

Issue

The use of a 10,000-year postclosure period for the repository has been raised by the public as an issue. More specifically, it has been stated that consideration of 10,000 years was inappropriate, given the potential for societal and technological change; the hazards and potential need for human intervention, since radioactive materials have half-lives much greater than 10,000 years; and the inability of science to forecast repository performance over long periods of time. In addition, concerns have been expressed about designing a system that would operate for 10,000 years and longer.

Response

As directed by Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law No. 102-486), the EPA is responsible for establishing the radiation protection standards for a repository at Yucca Mountain, and the NRC is responsible for developing criteria for licensing the repository that are consistent with the radiation protection standards.

In 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074), the EPA recognized that, while there is no scientific basis for limiting the period of the individual-risk standard to 10,000 years or any other period, there is considerable uncertainty that current modeling would provide meaningful projections for tens-of-thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of years. The final rule states that "simply because such models can provide projections for those time periods does not mean that those projections are meaningful and reliable enough to establish a rational basis for regulatory decisionmaking." It further states that "...as the compliance period is extended to such lengths, uncertainty generally increases and the resulting projected doses are increasingly meaningless from a policy perspective." The projections of impacts out to 10,000 years and beyond, which were based on a repository design comprising various engineered barriers and the natural barrier system, were developed in consideration of the EPA and NRC rules that specified a 10,000-year postclosure period. The EPA final rule, "Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada" (40 CFR Part 197, promulgated at 66 FR 32074), requires that the DOE demonstrate that there is a reasonable expectation of compliance with the standards specified in the rule for the 10,000-year postclosure period. If the DOE cannot make this demonstration, then the NRC would not issue a license pursuant to its regulations, "Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geological Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada" (10 CFR Part 63, promulgated at 66 FR55732, November 2, 2001).

Issue

An issue has been raised by the public about designing a system that would operate for 10,000 years and longer. Some of these concerns have cited the short experience of engineering practices compared to these time frames, along with comparisons between recorded history and the necessary period of performance.

Response

The DOE has provided its best estimate of the impacts that could occur when the containment system inevitably is degraded. Based on the repository design and performance assessment, the DOE believes that releases of radioactive materials for the 10,000-year postclosure period would likely be below the NRC's radiation protection standards for licensing.

In addition to the 10,000-year postclosure period, the DOE has evaluated potential impacts for the period of geologic stability at the repository (i.e., 1 million years). This evaluation was performed in accordance with 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) to gain insight into the long-term performance of the repository and thus provide information for the decision-makers in making both design and licensing decisions. The estimated mean annual dose reaches a peak value of 150 millirem per year at about 480,000 years following closure.

Issue

An issue was raised that the DOE evaluated peak doses for up to 1 million years and did not restrict itself to the arbitrary time limit of 10,000 years in the draft EPA Yucca Mountain Standard.

Response

The DOE has addressed peak dose in its calculations in the FEIS and would continue to evaluate peak dose hereafter as a means to better understand long-term performance of and to improve the design of the proposed repository. However, the DOE also agrees with the EPA that, because of the many uncertainties, these estimates should not be used to assess compliance with environmental protection standards.

Issue

An issue has been raised by the public concerning the definition of the term "isolation." Isolation has been interpreted by some to mean "absolute containment forever." Based on this interpretation, it was the general feeling of the commenters that the construction, operation, and monitoring, and eventual closure of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would not meet the criteria of "isolation." It was even suggested that the concept of "disposal" is not possible because this would require the same idea of absolute containment forever.

Response

In developing their standards at 40 CFR Part 197, the EPA took into consideration the National Research Council report on "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington. D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588.].

The EPA standards (40 CFR Part 197 [66 FR 32132]) recognize that, with the current state of technology, it is impossible to provide a reasonable expectation that there would be no releases over a 10,000-year or longer time frame. Therefore, the EPA has established licensing standards that provide comparable protections to those of other activities related to radioactive and nonradioactive wastes. These standards do not require complete isolation of the wastes during the 10,000-year postclosure or the period of geologic stability (1 million years). The purpose of a performance assessment for Yucca Mountain is to evaluate whether the repository would be likely to meet the applicable NRC and EPA licensing standards and thus provide adequate protection of human safety and the environment.

Issue

An issue has been raised by the public that the resultant peak doses expected from releases of radionuclides to the groundwater would be much larger than considered acceptable under any reasonable standard. Commenters also stated that the construction, operation, and monitoring, and eventual closure of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain would result in an irreversible commitment of groundwater in Amargosa Valley, Franklin, Lake Playa, and springs in Death Valley to contamination by radionuclides at a level that makes the water unfit for human use and a significant danger to the environment.

Response

As appropriate, the DOE would continue to evaluate physical locations that the mean peak dose could affect and to perform analysis consistent with the risk identified. The DOE would also continue to focus its attention at the point of regulatory compliance, which represents a location where impacts would be most likely given the greater possibility for groundwater withdrawal.

Issue

The location of the maximally exposed individual has been raised as an issue by the public, indicating that there is no rationale provided for the location and that the location is not conservative. It also has been suggested that the individual should be an age-weighted and gender-weighted subsistence farmer located at the repository operations area boundary. It also has been noted that the definition of the maximally exposed individual, as used by the DOE, is not the same as the RMEI used by the EPA.

Response

EPA standards (40 CFR Part 197 [66 FR 32074]) and NRC licensing regulations (10 CFR Part 63 [66 FR55732], November 2, 2001) specify the RMEI for a repository at Yucca Mountain.

The DOE has used the definition of the RMEI given in 10 CFR 63.312 (66 FR 55814), which defines this individual as a hypothetical person who meets the following criteria: (a) lives in the accessible environment above the highest concentration of radionuclides in the plume of contamination; (b) has a diet and living style representative of the people who now reside in the Town of Amargosa Valley, Nevada. The the DOE must use projections based upon surveys of the people residing in the Town of Amargosa Valley, Nevada, to determine their current diets and living styles and use the mean values of these factors in the assessments conducted consistent with 10 CFR 63.311 and 63.321; (c) uses well water with average concentrations of radionuclides based on an annual water demand of 3000 acre-feet; (d) drinks 2 liters of water per day from wells drilled into the groundwater at the location specified in paragraph (a) of section 63.312; and (e) is an adult with metabolic and physiological considerations consistent with present knowledge of adults.

The location of the RMEI described in 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) would be 18 kilometers (11 miles) from within a repository footprint.

The DOE has revised its definitions of the maximally exposed individual and RMEI as used in the FEIS. The DOE now uses the terms "maximally exposed individual" and "receptor." The receptor is essentially equivalent to both the "reasonably maximally exposed individual" defined in 40 CFR Part 197 (66 FR 32074) and the "average member of the critical group" defined in 10 CFR Part 63 (66 FR55372). However, for the purpose of evaluating impacts, the specific location of the receptor varies.

Issue

An issue has been raised by the public that the human intrusion scenario was inadequate, unrealistic, or too constrained. Indications are that additional effects such as atmospheric release and direct exposure of the drilling crew should have been considered. Some dissatisfaction has been expressed with only one occurrence or with the assumed timing of the occurrence. It has been suggested that the scenario was inadequate because it relied on the integrity of waste packages and the continuing use of current drilling technology. It is believed that the risk would increase over time because peak doses increase over time. Other concerns were stated about the possibility of sabotage over the next 10,000 years.

Response

Human intrusion into a repository is a possibility because the future behavior of humans cannot be forecasted. The NRC and the EPA have specified the ways to analyze human intrusions in their regulations and standards, respectively, for licensing a repository at Yucca Mountain. The regulations and standards describe a stylized calculation that attempts to minimize speculation as to why humans would intrude into the repository.

In formulating the standards for and regulatory approach to the human intrusion scenario, the EPA and the NRC paid attention to the advice given by "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" [National Research Council 1995. "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. TIC: 217588.]. That report suggests there are three types of intrusions: inadvertent and the intruder does not recognize that a hazard has been created, inadvertent and the driller recognizes the hazard and takes corrective action, and intentional [Ibid., page 114.]. The last category would include saboteurs, but it could also include a society needing to access the material for its energy content. The members of the National Research Council committee decided to recommend that only the first category be addressed because the second category, if corrective measures are ineffective, would have the same consequences as the first. The third category was an imponderable given the unpredictability of future human society. There is no way to absolutely ensure that if a future society wished to reenter a repository, it would not be able to do so.

The members of the committee then assessed the types of consequences from the first category of intrusion. There would be drill cuttings brought to the surface, and these would present a hazard to the drillers and subsequent visitors to the site. It was suggested that these types of consequences not be considered because they are the consequences of an intrusion that would apply no matter where the repository was located and, therefore, would not provide useful information about the safety of any particular location. The consequence recommended for evaluation was the dose to the same critical population group addressed in the long-term performance of the undisturbed repository. Therefore, the important point is how the intrusion event affects safety by potentially degrading the engineered and natural barriers in a given location.

With regard to evaluating multiple intrusion events, the "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" [Ibid., pages 112 and 113.] concluded that one borehole was a good test of system resiliency, and going further was so speculative that it served no useful purpose in judging the robustness of a system. The National Research Council also recommended the assumption of the use of current drilling technology to avoid speculation about future advances in drilling technology. The emphasis was recommended to be on the analysis of the creation of enhanced environmental transport pathways.

These conclusions and recommendations have been considered by the EPA in their final Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada (40 CFR 197.26 [66 FR 32074) and implemented in NRC's final 10 CFR Part 63 regulations for licensing. These regulations would require the DOE to determine the timing of human intrusion based on when waste package degradation would enable such an intrusion without recognition by drillers.

Consistent with the NRC licensing regulations referenced in the DOE guidelines, the DOE determined the earliest time after disposal that the waste package would degrade sufficiently that a human intrusion could occur without recognition by the drillers. DOE determined that such intrusion could occur no sooner than approximately 30,000 years after disposal. The DOE included the results of a human intrusion at 30,000 years in the FEIS.

4.2.3 (52)

Summary Comment

Issues were raised that the DOE received thousands of comments from members of the public on the DEIS, and that the DOE needs to respond to these comments and issue the FEIS before it can complete the Site Recommendation for Yucca Mountain.

Response

Any recommendation by the Secretary to the President will be accompanied by, among other things, the FEIS, which includes the response to public comments on the DEIS and the SDEIS.

An issue has been raised by the public about the incorporation of the Nevada Test Site Underground Test Area Program and how it was being factored into the site recommendation work.

Chapter 9 of the FEIS addresses Cumulative Impacts, including the impacts of past activities at the Nevada Test Site. In addition, for the last several years, the DOE, in close cooperation with the U.S. Geological Survey, the National Park Service, Nye County, Inyo County, and other entities, has supported the development of a regional model of groundwater flow that combines the data acquired by the Yucca Mountain Site Ch